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JUNE 1958
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ANTITRUST CON SID ERATIO NS IN
MOTOR CARRIER MERGERSt

Carl H. Fulda*
l. THE APPLICABLE STATUTES
of separate independent business enterprises in a
single organization may raise important questions of antitrust
policy. The entity which emerges may have acquired, as a result
of such unification, a market position of such significance that a
substantial lessening of competition or even the creation of a
monopoly becomes not only possible but probable. This would be
apparent whenever opportunities for buyers of the products or
services of the new single unit to shop freely, and to make independent decisions as to prices, channels of purchases and selection
of suppliers were to be seriously curtailed, or where such curtailment could be expected in due course.1 On the other hand, unification may lead to lower costs and increased efficiency, and may even
enhance competition by permitting smaller firms to consolidate
their resources in order to increase their ability to engage in rivalry
with larger firms. These considerations are reflected in section 7
of the Clayton Act which declares unlawful the acquisition of the
whole or any part of the stock or assets of a corporation engaged
in interstate commerce, "where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-

U

NIFICATION

tThis is one of several articles which will be integrated into a text on "Competition
in the Regulated Industries" to be published by Little, Brown &: Company (Trade _
Regulation Series, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Editor). A previous article, "Competition
Versus Regulation: The Agricultural Exemption in the Motor Carrier Act," appeared
in 11 VAND. L. REv. 543 (1958). The special problem of motor-carrier mergers involving
control by a railroad (under the proviso of section 5(2)(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act)
will be treated in a later article.
•Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.-Ed.
1 FTC: REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 184 (May 1955).
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stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 2
This was intended "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their
incipiency." 3 Therefore, "the section is violated whether or not
actual restraints or ip.onopolies, or the substantial lessening of
competition, have occurred or are intended." 4
Section 11 of the Clayton Act provides that "authority to enforce compliance with" this so-called anti-merger law by common
carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act is vested in the
Interstate Commerce Commission, but the attorney general is authorized to intervene in such proceedings before the Commission. 5
However, section 5(2)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides:
"It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of
the [Interstate Commerce] Commission . . . "(i) for two or
more carriers to consolidate or merge their properties or franchises, or any part thereof, into one corporation fqr the ownership, management, and operation of the properties theretofore
in separate ownership; or for any carrier, or two or more carriers jointly, to acquire control of another through ownership of its stock or otherwise .... " 6
If the Commission, after notice and hearing, finds that the proposed transaction "will be consistent with the public interest, it
shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction,
upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications . . .
found to be just and reasonable." 7 Thereafter, all participants in
a transaction thus authorized "shall be ... relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws ... in so far as may be necessary to enable
them to carry into effect the transaction to be approved or provided
for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by
-the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such
transactions. " 8
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125-1128 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §18. The
1950 amendment broadened the section by adding acquisition of the assets of another
company. For discussion of other changes of the original wording see REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 117 (1955)
(hereinafter cited REPORT).
3 S. Rep. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950), quoted in REPORT 117.
4 United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 at 589 (1957). For
a list of cases involving mergers under the Sherman Act, see REPORT at 115.
5 38 Stat. 734 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21.
6 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(2)(a).
7 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(2)(b).
s 54 Stat. 908-909 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(11). The 1950 amendment of §7 of the
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ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST
AND REGULATORY POLICIES

This complicated statutory scheme requires an accommodation
of the philosophy of competition embodied in the antitrust laws
with the philosophy of regulation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. It indicates that at some point the two may become
irreconcilable, and that in such a case the Commission may approve transactions which, without such approval, would violate the
antitrust laws. In short, the Commission seems to be authorized to
give its blessing to mergers with anti-competitive effects if it finds
such mergers "consistent with the public interest." This statement
demonstrates, of course, that the "public interest" with respect
to mergers in a regulated industry such as motor carriers may have
to be measured by other than antitrust standards ordinarily applicable to interstate commerce.
All of these problems were presented to the Supreme Court in
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,9 where the Court was
asked to set aside an order of the Commission which had authorized consolidation of seven large motor carriers of property into
Associated Transport, Inc. The Commission found great benefits
would result from the proposed unification: "More efficient and
greater utilization of equipment, and corresponding reduction in
consumption of motor fuel and tires," "a higher load factor on
vehicles," "a large reduction in the number of trucks required for
peddler runs and for pick-up and delivery service at terminal
points," and "extension of scientific maintenance and safety programs."10 Vehicles could be more easily shifted from one part of the
system to another to meet seasonal demands; separate terminals
could be consolidated at some points; at others a "rearrangement
of use" of terminals, one for in-bound and one for out-bound traffic, would reduce congestion and bring about substantial economies. Poor terminals would be replaced by satisfactory ones.

Clayton Act, note 2 supra, explicitly states that nothing contained in that section shall
apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
321 U.S. 67 (1944).
Transport, lnc.-Control and Consolidation-Arrow Carrier Corp., 38
M.C.C. 137 at 143 (1942). A prior attempt at large scale consolidation by these parties
was disapproved in the Transport Co. case, 36 M.C.C. 61 (1940), because of failure to
simplify corporate structure and excessive consideration. See Meck and Bogue, "Federal
Regulation of Motor Carrier Unification," 50 YALE L. J. 1376 (1941).
9

10 Associated
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Through movement of freight would reduce loss and damage
claims, expedite service and eliminate the complications arising
from interchange of vehicles between independent connecting
carriers. "Substantial savings" could also be made in general and
administrative expenses and by the new firm's "ability to obtain
necessary financing at lower cost."11
But what about the effect on competition? Concededly, this
merger would create "the largest common carrier of property by
motor vehicle in the United States,"12 a vertical "end-to-end consolidation from points in the far South to New England," with
routes "extending over 24,338 miles" 13 as the result of the unification of carriers operating in the South with Northern Lines. In
fact, "there would be no other single carrier authorized to operate
throughout the territory ... between Boston and New Orleans."14
The merger was, also, a horizontal one in that some of the parties
were in competition with each other in the same territory where
they owned duplicating facilities. 15 Hence, the Antitrust Division
and others opposed the merger on the ground that it would unduly
restrain competition in the motor carrier industry. The Commission acknowledged that "substantial competition exists between
certain of the carriers involved" which would be eliminated by
consummation of the proposal. But section 5 of the Interstate
Commerce Act was not intended to permit approval of "only such
transactions as would not result in an 'unreasonable' restraint of
competition within the meaning of the antitrust laws ...." Instead,
the Commission read into the specific reference to antitrust the
congressional intent that it is authorized "to permit unifications
which would, except for such approval, result in restraining competition contrary to the antitrust laws, where the disadvantages of
such restraint are overcome by other advantages in the public interest"16 such as those found in this case. Moreover, a detailed an1138 M.C.C. 137 at 144-145 (1942). The gross revenues of Associated Transport have
been increasing every year and are still the largest among carriers of general freight.
But its net revenues have declined since 1950. See Moooy's 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL,
p. 1371. In the third quarter of 1956 :fifty other carriers had higher nets. S. Hearings
Before Select Committee on Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentration), 85th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1957). See also id., pp. 103, 104, 152.
12 38 M.C.C. 137 at 161 (1942).
13 321 U.S. 67 at 71 (1944).
14 38 M.C.C. 137 at 160 (1942).
15 Id. at 144; REPORT 289.
16 38 M:.C.C. 137 at 150 (1942). Accord, Consolidated Freightways, Inc.-PurchasePacific Intermountain Express Co., 38 M.C.C. 577 at 591 (1942) (Acquisition of certain
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alysis of the New England, Middle Atlantic and Southern regions17
demonstrated that "there would remain ample competitive motorcarrier service throughout the territory involved" in addition to
rail, contract carrier and freight forwarding services.18
The majority of the Supreme Court fully approved. The Court
observed that section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act was "not
only a more recent but a more specific expression of policy"19 than
antitrust legislation.20 In fact, "the premises of motor carrier regulation posit some curtailment of free and unrestrained competition."21 The provision for administrative grant of immunity from
the antitrust laws took into account the fact that rate regulation
was a "safeguard against the evils attending monopoly." 22 Hence,
the Commission was "not bound . . . to accede to the policies of
the antitrust laws so completely that only where 'inadequate' transportation facilities are sought to be made 'adequate' by consolidation can their dictates be overborne by 'the public interest.' " On

operating rights in Idaho, Montana, Utah and Nevada approved against objections of
Antitrust Division to virtual monopoly of vendee in the West. Vendor and vendee
operated 383 miles over the same highway. Remainder of the routes (667 :miles) sought
to be purchased were complementary to vendee's routes. Vendee would have competition
from at least one other motor carrier at all points).
17 38
18 Id.

M.C.C. 137 at 151-159 (1942).
at 159-160. The Commission also pointed out that "there are a number of
large systems of motor carriers of property in existence at present •.•" and that due
to the ease of entry and the advantages of small carriers because of "their ability to
render a more personalized service . • • monopoly is little to be feared at this stage
of the development of the trucking industry." Id. at 161. As to the danger of "diversion
of interchange traffic now delivered by the carriers involved to other connecting lines"
the Commission observed that the traffic diverted from connecting carriers to the
combined new enterprise would be equalized by traffic which would be diverted from
the applicant to others. Id. at 162. See the discussion of this aspect of the case in
Schwartz, "Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication
of Judicial Responsibility," 67 HARv. L. REv. 436 at 446-447 (1954).
19 321 U.S. 67 at 79 (1944).
20 As noted in note 8 supra, the 1950 amendment of the "anti-merger" section of
the Clayton Act explicitly acknowledged the supremacy of the Commission in approving
merger proposals.
21321 U.S. 67 at 83 (1944). The quoted statement is documented by a footnote
referring to the legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. See 1934 REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, H. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 13:
"It may be taken as settled that there is no substantial body of opinion in the country
in favor of permitting competition to reign in the transportation field free and without
restraint." See, also, statement of Commissioner Eastman in "Regulation of Interstate
Motor Carriers," Hearing before Subcommittee of House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5262 and 6016, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1935) (hereinafter
cited as House Hearings): " ••• there is now a tremendous oversupply of transportation
facilities and there has been an extraordinary increase in transportation competition."
22 321 U.S. 67 at 85 (1944).
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the other hand, the antitrust laws are not wholly inapplicable.23
The Court defined the Commission's task as requiring it to "estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the proposed consolidation and
consider them along with the advantages of improved service,
safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation
policy." 24
The Court found unassailable the Commission's performance
of this "complex task" in this instance.
The dissent of Justice Douglas urged that "administrative authority to replace the competitive system with a cartel should be
strictly construed." ConsequeJ.?.tly, particular mergers or consolidations should be permitted only upon an affirmative finding "that
the policy of the Transportation Act would be thwarted" by withholding such permission.25
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the
McLean Trucking Co. case thus involves the standard of legality
by-which the Commission shall judge the public interest in merger
applications.26 The dissent would resolve all doubts in favor of antitrust policy and thus create a presumption requiring disapproval
of mergers with anti-competitive effects, subject to rebuttal. The
majority merely demands that the Commission consider anticompetitive effects as one of several factors which it' must weigh
before reaching a decision. Obviously,27 under this view approval
of mergers is infinitely easier than it would have been had the dissent prevailed. In this connection it has been noted that antitrust
problems with respect to motor carrier consolidations may be intensified because entry into the industry is restricted. 28 Without
such restriction, competition and the low cost of entry for newcomers would be an adequate safeguard against monopoly. But, in
view of the certificate requirements of the act, "the principal
motivation for most acquisitions is the desire to obtain additional
operating rights" previously granted to other carriers. 29 The ques23 Id. at 86.
24 Id. at 87.
25 Id. at 93-94.
26 See SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, LEGAL AND RELATED
MATERIALS 102 (1952).
27 In view of the Court's tendency not to disturb administrative decisions based on

expert knowledge of the regulated industries.
28 49 u.s.c. (1952) §§306-309.
29 The Attorney General's Committee (REPORT 266) comments: "Were motor carrier
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tion of the competitive effect of such combined rights is thus likely
to arise in most merger cases.
In so far as the merger approved in the McLean Trucking
case is concerned, "substantial" curtailment of competition between the carriers involved was admitted. But, as noted above, the
Commission took great pains to explain that "ample" competition
remained. Consequently, the merger might have been defensible
if the Sherman Act alone had been applicable.30 In fact, thirteen
years after the Supreme Court rejected the request of McLean
Trucking Company to set aside this consolidation, that company
itself had become so prosperous as to apply for listing of its stock
on the New York Stock Exchange.31 Its fears about the effect of
the merger thus proved groundless. In any event, it would be an
over-simplification to conclude from the McLean Trucking case
that the Commission's job merely consists of balancing adverse
effects on competition against favorable results of improved service, lower costs, and so on, and to approve the merger if it feels
that the latter outweigh the former. The task is more complicated
because, as the Supreme Court noted in the McLean Trucking
case,32 federal motor carrier regulation was not intended to eliminate all competition, but only excessive or wasteful competition.
Hence, an additional inquiry into the question as to how much
competition has been or will be restrained, and how much will survive, and whether the latter will be a sufficient barrier against the
detrimental effects of monopoly, seems inevitable in merger cases.
It is hardly necessary to add that this increases immeasurably the
difficulties and unpredictabilities of the outcome in each case33 and
the range of discretion to be exercised by the Commission.

entry unrestricted, rarely, if ever, would a consolidation raise important antitrust
problems."
30 Compare United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 530 (1948) (elimination
of competition between participants to a merger held not unreasonable). Again, Justice
Douglas dissented. Under the more severe tests of §7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, the
case for the merger would have been more difficult.
31 "Milestone Looms for Truckers," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1957, p. 38:2. The
company operates in 17 states and has 4000 stockholders. Estimated gross income in 1957:
$29,000,000. Approval of the application would make this the first Motor Freight Carrier
so listed. McLean Trucking Co. was incorporated in 1940, four years before the Supreme
Court decision. By 1951, its operating revenues amounted to $13,613,000. In 1956 this
had grown to $21,414,000. MOODY'S 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL, pp. 1377, 1378.
32 Note 21 supra.
33 See KOONTZ AND GABLE, PUBLIC CONTROL OF EcoNO!IIIC ENTERPRISE 179-180 (1956):
"Regulation [of Transportation] as Monopolies while insisting on Competition:-Perhaps
it is in the public interest to promote competition, while at the same time placing
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The problem of reconciling antitrust with regulatory policies
is, perhaps, even more dramatically illustrated in the case of Allied
Van Lines, Inc., the largest mover of household goods in the country. Allied was incorporated in 1928 for the purpose of solving the
back-haul problem. "Because of the character of the traffic, it was
difficult for either the warehousemen-carriers or their drivers to
arrange return loads and the ratio of empty to loaded vehiclemiles became burdensomely high." 34 Accordingly, Allied entered
into contracts with independent motor carriers of household goods
who were classified as "agents" and grouped in two classes: "(I)
booking or non-hauling agents, who solicit and record shipments
for transportation in Allied's name but do not supply any equipment or perform any physical transportation, and (2) combined
booking and hauling agents, commonly referred to simply as hauling agents, who ... also supply equipment for the transportation
of designated shipments in Allied'S- name." In 1944, Allied had
272 booking agents and 354 hauling agents in 47 states.35 Pursuant to these 1;:ontracts
" ... hauling agents agreed to register with Allied all shipments moving over I 00 miles booked by them, haul loads
booked by Allied and other nonhauling agents, and maintain
at least one van bearing Allied's name, color and design. Nonhauling agents entered into similar contracts but did not agree
to transport loads or maintain equipment. Uniformity of
soliciting, booking, and dispatching was assured by issuance
of all shipping papers in Allied's name and pursuant to its
rules and regulations. . . . Allied assumed final responsibility
to the public for all loss and damage, but this was charged
back against the particular agent if responsibility for damage
could be so traced. " 36
Hauling agents received 96 percent of the line-haul revenue
for shipments booked and hauled by them, the balance going to
Allied as a service charge. The share of booking agents ranged
from 20 to 25 percent. Settlements were made monthly with all

obstacles to the free play of competitive forces in an industry, such as transportation,
where competitive excesses might impair the entire economy. But the inconsistency
should be recognized and its manifestations in controls carefully weighed."
34Allied Van Lines, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 46 M.C.C. 159 at 162 (1946).
35 Id. at 166.
36 Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Evanston Fireproof Warehouse-Control, 40
M.C.C. 557 at 562-563 (1946).
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agents. 37 Drivers, helpers and mechanics were hired and paid by
the "agents."38
After enactment of the Motor Carrier Act most of Allied's
agents received individual "grandfather" operating authorities
from the Commission.39 But the position of Allied itself was not
clear. In 1943 the Commission denied Allied's application for approval of its agreements with its agents pursuant to section 5(1) of
the Interstate Commerce Act which authorizes approval of contracts by common carriers "for the pooling or division of traffic, or
of service, or of gross or net earnings, or of any portion thereof,"
upon a finding that such pooling "will be in the interest of better
service to the public or of economy in operation, and will not
unduly restrain competition." 40 The Commission held that these
agreements went beyond mere "pooling" in that they effected
complete surrender to Allied by the individual motor-carrier
"agents" of their power to control their future operations, and
Allied as their principal would assume the status of a common carrier.41 Subsequently, the Antitrust Division, which had opposed
the pooling application, filed a complaint against Allied charging
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The result was a consent
decree which required cancellation of Allied's contracts with its
agents and enjoined Allied and all of its agents from maintaining
or furthering any arrangements with others, from agreeing upon
rates and practices with any carrier or warehouseman except by
establishing joint rates for interline shipments over connecting
routes, from making uniform rates or practices, allocating territory, leasing equipment to Allied and from conditioning dealings
of Allied with carriers upon their refraining from dealing with
others. Plaintiff was authorized to petition for dissolution of the
Allied System, and the court retained jurisdiction for that purpose.42
37 Id. at 563. For further details see Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Pooling, 39 M.C.C. 287
at 296-297 (1943).
38 40 M.C.C. 557 at 560 (1946).
39 46 M.C.C. 159 at 166 (1946). Section 206 of the Motor Carrier Act [49 Stat. 551
(1935), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §306] provides that "if any such carrier or predecessor in interest
was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle on June 1, 1935 •••
and has so operated since that time • • • the Commission shall issue such certificate
without requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served
by such operation. . • ."
40 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(1).
u 39 M.C.C. 287 at 306 (1943). Competition between the "pooling" carriers had been
eliminated by the plan. Id. at 304.
42 United States v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., National Furniture Warehousemen's Assn.,
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Shortly thereafter the Commission denied Allied's application
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity as a common
carrier by motor vehicle of household goods. 43 It again held that
Allied was not a common carrier, since it "does not o,vn any vehicles and does not contemplate so doing and . . . does not have
funds with which to provide itself with equipment, and facilities
with which to conduct a nation-wide transportation system."
Hence, Allied was merely "a device" in the hands of its members,
who compete with each other. Such common control afforded
undesirable opportunities for unfair competition, unjust discriminations and preferences between shippers and consignees.44 Moreover, discontinuance of Allied would not be detrimental to the
public, because there are "a large number of carriers authorized
to transport household goods over large portions of the country
and there are several nation-wide operators. . . . Many carriers,
both large and small, have successfully conducted household-goods
operations without the aid of a superimposed holder of a blanket
certificate such as Allied is seeking."45 Finally, the antitrust consent decree was referred to in support of th~ conclusion that Allied's proposed operations are not required by present or future
public convenience and necessity. 46
This virtual death sentence of Allied was nullified less than
three months later by the Commission's approval of Allied's proposal to purchase the operating rights of 326 of its hauling agents
for $1. Each transferor would purchase one share of Allied stock
at a price of $10 a share, with the result that mvnership of Allied
would pass to its former hauling agents. A so-called noncarrier
agency agreement would be entered into between Allied and the
transferors, pursuant to which Allied agreed to employ each transferor as its agent. Allied would insure and compensate each transferor and would lease all vehicles meeting its specifications.47 The
transferors would lose their operating rights and, thus, cease to
be interstate motor carriers. Consequently, they could not resume
rendering service if they should discontinue their connection with
Allied. 48 The Commission now found that the transaction was
(Civil Action No. 44-C-30, N.D. 111., Dec. 28, 1945) 1944-1945 CCH Trade Cas. 1[57,427.
43 46
44 Id.
45 Id.

M.C.C. 159 (1946).
at 200, 201 and cases there cited.
at 205.
46 Id. at 206, 207.
47 40 M.C.C. 557 at 563-565 (1946).
48 Id. at 610.
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covered by the language of section 5(2)(a)(i) of the Interstate Commerce Act permitting authorization for "a person which is not a
carrier [such as Allied] to acquire control of two or more carriers,''49 would permit integration of a cooperative nation-wide
system, remove any question of illegality under the antitrust laws
and terminate expensive litigation. 50
With respect to competition the Commission noted that its
approval would "give permanence to substantially the same arrangement that originated in 1928," which "always had the competition of numerous carriers, large and small, Nation-wide and
local." 51 Hence, "elimination of some competition among the transferor-applicants ... is not the controlling consideration." 52 The
transaction would be in the public interest since "adequate competition" would remain.53 The antitrust decree would be wiped
out by the Commission's approval, pursuant to section 5(11) of
the Interstate Commerce Act; indeed, this was sanctioned by
precedent. In United States v. Southern Pacific Company,54 the
Supreme Court directed "that a decree be entered severing the
control by the Southern Pacific of the Central Pacific by stock
ownership or by lease." Subsequently, the Commission approved
such a lease, 55 with the result that the Supreme Court's decision
was superseded by legalization of a previously unlawful relationship between the two railroads. 56
The Commission's approval of the Allied Van Lines consolidation was criticized by two dissenting members57 and by more recent
commentators58 who were understandably bewildered by the aston49 Id.

at 583.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 592. The other Nation-wide carriers of household goods are Aero Mayflower
Transit Co., United Van Lines, Inc., North American Van Lines, Inc. and Greyvan Lines,
Inc. Id. at 589. The problem of competition is discussed at 588-594.
52 Id. at 592.
53 Id. at 594.
54 259 U.S. 214 at 241 (1922).
55 Control of Central Pacific by Southern Pacific, 76 I.C.C. 508 at 516 (1923): "When
by our order based upon broad considerations of the public interest we in effect grant
relief against antitrust laws, ..• we are exercising a power which the statute gives to
us alone. Evidence as to public benefits to be derived from common control of competing
carriers, which would be immaterial in a prosecution under the Sherman Act, might be
entirely pertinent in a proceeding before us. . . ."
56 United States v. Southern Pacific Co., (D.C. Utah 1923) 290 F. 443.
57 40 M.C.C. 557 at 610-612 (1946).
58 Adams and Hendry, "Trucking Mergers, Concentration, and Small Business: An
Analysis of I.C.C. Policy, 1950-1956,'' Appendix to S. Hearings Before Select Committee
on Small Business (Trucking ,Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 338343 (1957). (This Appendix is hereinafter cited as Adams Report.)
50
51
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ishing jump from total condemnation to total approval of operations different in legal forms but identical in practical effect. Yet,
the approval decision followed closely the rationale of the Supreme
Court in the McLean Trucking case. Creation of a large entity,
the largest of its kind, would produce tangible benefits, and competition would remain alive, although the elimination of the competition among the formerly independent members of the combination had been condemned as violative of the antitrust laws.59
Consequently, the Commission's approval was in accordance with
existing law as to mergers. It was also induced by reasons of administrative and economic preference for supervising one instead
of 326 certificate holders, 60 and this attitude-also demonstrated
by the Commission's treatment of Allied's principal competitors61
-rather than the debatable technicality that prior to consolidation
Allied was not a "common carrier" within the meaning of the
act 62 may explain the apparent inconsistency in the dispositions of
Allied's applications for a certificate and for authority to merge.
Indeed, the nature of household-goods transportation was thought
to justify and even require participation in large groups of wide
territorial coverage in order to lick the return-load problem, and
59 Even under the antitrust laws cooperative arrangements by a multitude of small
firms may be condemned though comparable in effect to the lawful activities of one
single large firm. See the Brandeis dissent in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 at 419 (1921). Compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 at 374 (1933).
60 In the Associated Transport case, 38 M.C.C. 137 at 162 (1942), the Commission
said that "the legislative history of section 5 indicates a clear Congressional intent to
encourage unifications. . . ." The Adams Report, note 58 supra, points out (p. 337)
that due to subsequent acquisitions of operating rights the number of stockholder-agents
of Allied reached 625 .by mid-1956. See Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Allen, 45 M.C.C.
751 (1947) (purchase of rights of 47 motor-vehicle common carriers); Allied Van Lines,
Inc.-Purchase-Johnston, 50 M.C.C. 273 (1948) (purchase of rights of 6 carriers); Allied
Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Albrent Freight and Storage Corp., 50 M.C.C. 653 (1948)
(purchase of 4 carriers); Allied Van Lines-Purchase-Cold Spring Storage Co., 58 M.C.C.
101 (1951) (purchase of 6 carriers). The Adams Report criticizes the Commission for its
failure to understand the impact of the Allied System on the market (p. 343). But the
Commission dealt with that problem explicitly as shown in notes 51-53 supra.
61 They are United Van Lines and North American Van Lines, organized along
lines similar to. Allied. Geitz Storage & Moving Co., Inc.-Investigation of ControlUnited Van Lines, Inc., 65 ,M.C.C. 257 (1955), reversing 55 M.C.C. 649 (1949) (operations
of United Van Lines approved, in spite of pooling agreements unlawfully entered into
without prior Commission approval; -benefits of coordinated activities held to outweigh
. restraint on competition betlveen United and its agents, and preservation of United
deemed necessary to offer competition to other major van lines). See Adams Report,
note 58 supra, pp. 343-348. Accord, North American Van Lines, Inc.-Investigation of
Control, 60 M.C.C. 701 (1955). See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 348-350.
62 For ·the Commission's interpretation of the statutory definition in 49 U.S.C. (1952)
§303(14), see 46 M.C.C. 159 at 189-197 (1946).
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the existence of several such groups competing with each other
is deemed to protect the public against monopolistic abuses. 63
However, it may not always work out that way. In 1956 the leading moving and storage companies consented to the entry of a
decree forbidding them to "fix, stabilize or tamper with price
quotations to the U.S. Government for interstate movement of
household goods of military personnel." 64 The antitrust weapon
was, thus, used as a supplement to regulatory supervision. But
this intrusion of the Sherman Act was short-lived. A 1957 amendment of section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act now authorizes
the commission to approve agreements relating to quotations of
rates or charges to the United States Government for transportation of persons or property; such approval shall relieve the parties
from antitrust liability in the same manner as provided in the
Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 for rate agreements generally.65
In any event, some crucial questions remain: How much competition is deemed necessary to protect the public against the evils
of monopoly, how much is irrelevant, and how much is intolerable?66 And is there a regulatory philosophy which may furnish
guideposts for solving these problems? The search for even tentative answers, if there are any, requires a survey of the commission's leading merger decisions. 67

III.

THE GREYHOUND MERGERS

Greyhound Corporation is the largest motor carrier of passengers in the United States. It was organized in 1926, and operates
63 Testimony of 0. Clarke, chairman of I.C.C., in S. Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p.
48 (1957). There are in addition to the large systems, numerous independent interstate
and intrastate carriers of household goods. Statement by Clardy, id. at 167. See Adams
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 227-228, on the structure of the Household Movers Industry.
64 United States Aero Mayflower Transit Co., (S.D. Ga. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade
Cas. 1[68,526. The government did not consent, but did not appeal.
65 71 Stat. 564 (1957), 49 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §22(2). The Reed-Bulwinkle Act is
to be found at 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(b).
66 See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 355-356.
67 From enactment of the -Motor Carrier Act to Nov. I, 1955, the Commission received
6,123 merger applications involving motor carriers. I.C.C. Administration of the Motor
Carrier Act, S. Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st
sess., p. 329 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Small Business Hearings). From Nov. I, 1955 to
Oct. 31, 1956 there were 379 such applications. I.C.C. 70m ANN. REP. 78. The Commission
commented (at 75-76) on the continuing trend of the development of motor carrier
systems through purchases and mergers. Since the 1920's many individual small scale
operators then in the majority have died or sold out. See also I.C.C. 7Isr ANN. REP.
53-56 (1957).
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nearly 6,000 buses over certificated routes approximating 100,000
miles, thus· accounting for about one half of intercity bus business. 68 In 1956 it had total assets in excess of $251,000,000 and
gross revenues in excess of $238,000, operated over 505,000,000
bus miles and 9,371,000,000 passenger miles. 69
In 1936 the Commission approved unopposed merger applications of 22 of the constituent companies of the Greyhound System.70 It described Greyhound Corporation as "a single proprietary
holding company" embracing "groups of subsidiary companies
operating bus lines practically throughout continental United
States." 71 The plan for a national system had been developed along
three lines: "(I) Autonomous regional operation; (2) uniform
national policies and centralized control of common functions
and standards; and (3) coordination, wherever possible, with other
forms of transportation." From its inception, the system grew by
acquisitions of many large and small companies. 72
Subsequently, many applications for approval of additional
acquisitions by Greyhound were presented to the Commission.
Some of these were denied because of the dominant position of
the Greyhound System and the resulting danger of a bus monopoly
in the area. Thus, in Illinois Greyhound Lines-Purchases-The
Southern Ltd., Inc.,73 Southern operated "over routes complementary to those of members of the Greyhound system, but ... competitive with the latter between Chicago and Paducah, between
Chicago and Evansville, and between Chicago and Terre Haute
and Vincennes .... If the purchase [of Southern] were approved,
Greyhound Companies would operate over all of the most direct
routes between Chicago and Evansville and Chicago and Paducah,
whereas no other motorbus company would be authorized to oper-

"Building a Highway Empire," Bus. WEEK, March 16, 1957, p. 175.
United States v. Greyhound Corp., Civil Action No. 57-C-II07, Complaint No. 2,
(N.D. Ill., June 27, 1957). Greyhound also operates Greyvan, a household moving company,
Greyhound Post Houses (restaurants), motels and a rent-a-car service. It has six operating
divisions (Eastern, Southeastern, Great Lakes, Northland, Florida and Northwest), four
domestic (Pacific, Southwestern, Atlantic and Richmond), and two Canadian subsidiaries.
Net income in 1955 was $13,800,000. Bus. WEEK, March 16, 1957, p. 175 at 176, 178, 179.
70 Greyhound Mergers, I M.C.C. 342 (1936). The individual operating companies
were absorbed by the major geographical subsidiary groups.
71 Id. at 343.
72 Id. at 346. As to subsequent merger decisions, see especially Greyhound Mergers
1948 and 1949, 55 M.C.C. 237 and 56 M.C.C. 238, and Eastern Canadian GreyhoundControl and Merger, 55 M.C.C. 189 (1948).
73 38 M.C.C. 641 (1942).
68
69
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ate over any such routes between those points." 74 A passenger
could still travel from Chicago to Evansville via LaFayette and
Terre Haute, using three different carriers other than Greyhound,
and he could travel circuitously on non-Greyhound Lines between
Chicago and Paducah, but this would not be too attractive. Hence,
elimination of the "substantial two-line competition ... heretofore
. . . afforded by the independent existence of Southern with its
direct lines to Chicago ... would give the Greyhound Companies
an advantage impossible to meet." 75 Eight members of the Commission thought this would not be in the public interest. A later
purchase by Greyhound of a 40 percent stock interest in Southern
was declared unlawful and divestiture ordered on the ground that
even such a minority interest would give Greyhound monopolistic
power. 76
This decision was followed in Southwestern Greyhound Lines,
Inc.-Merger-Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., Inc. 11 In that case,
the Antitrust Division, in opposing the merger, observed that
"the Greyhound Companies have the only integrated national
bus system." It urged "that, if monopoly in the industry is to be
avoided, a definite policy to prevent the Greyhound Companies
from acquiring independent operations, which otherwise could
some day be molded into an independent competitive bus system,
should be established." 78 A protesting bus company (MissouriPacific Transportation) invoked the Illinois Greyhound case, and
the Commission, in accepting that decision as controlling precedent, noted that there the last remaining bus competition was to
be eliminated by merger, while in the present case one of two
competitors would remain. Nevertheless, the same considerations

74 Id.

at 647.
Id. at 648. The majority found no benefits which would offset "the harmful effects
resulting from restraint of competition." The dissenters thought that the benefit of
through one-line service should control.
76 The Greyhound Corporation-Investigation of Control-The Southern Limited,
Inc., 45 M.C.C. 59 (1946). At pp. 70-71, reference is made to a contractual arrangement
by which Southern utilizes Greyhound terminals; denial of this privilege "could cripple"
Southern, hence, Greyhound should not be given power to control Southern. See also
Dollar Lines-Purchase-United Stages System, 40 M.C.C. 63 (1944) (acquisition of
control by Greyhound of small second-class duplicating service as a competitive "fighting
ship" denied).
77 39 M.C.C. 721 (1944), affirming 39 M.C.C. 243 (1943).
' 78Id. at 727. The argument referred to Trailways as a start in the development of
a competitive system, having "the vulnerability of all loose associations in competition
with integrated systems."
75
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required denial of Southwestern's application. Said the Comm1Ss1on:
"The Trailways Companies east of the Mississippi River do
not have the territorial coverage, facilities, or schedules equal
to those maintained by Greyhound Companies in that territory; nor, in the aggregate; do they have financial resources
comparable to those of Greyhound. If the merger were consummated, such small advantage as now accrues to Missouri
Pacific Transportation and Coaches by reason of their somewhat more desirable route west of Memphis would be canceled by the latter's coverage of both routes and the elimination of Coaches. While Missouri Pacific Transportation would
continue to be largely dependent on Greyhound Companies
to receive its passengers moving north, south, and east of
Memphis, it would no longer be likely to receive traffic from
Greyhound Companies for movement over this route. It is also
worthy of comment that the result of elimination of Coaches
as an independent competitor would leave the field solely to a
railroad-controlled motor bus company and to Greyhound.
Such a narrowed competitive situation, which already has
largely been brought about in territory west and north of
Texarkana and Little Rock and in other sections of the country through the steady elimination of independent motor bus
companies by railroads, on the one hand, or Greyhound, on
the other, is not productive of the healthiest possible passenger-transportation conditions. " 79
But what about offsetting benefits to the public? The Commission conceded that some advantage through routing over a
somewhat more direct and desirable route would result for "that
part of the public which travels via Greyhound," but this was
outweighed by restraint of competition. The merger would permit Greyhound to drive another wedge into local territory by
absorption of a relatively small operator who "has been familiar
with the transportation needs of the numerous small points on its
routes" and served them satisfactorily. Hence, "preservation of
the existing competitive situation is more likely to result in efficient local service at points served by Coaches and this applicant
than would be the case if Southwestern Greyhound were permitted
to serve this additional territory." 80
79 Id. at 731-732. The "steady elimination of independent motor bus companies"
could, of course, not have taken place without Commission approval.
so Id. at 732-733.
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Antitrust considerations also prevailed in Southeastern Greyhound Lines-Control-Lewisburg Bus Lines~ Inc.,8 1 wherein Division 4 denied authority to acquire control of three independent
bus lines operating in Alabama, Georgia, Florida and Tennessee.
It found the purpose of these acquisitions was "the desire of Southeastern to protect itself from the growing competition of Trailways, through elimination of the independence of the three carriers and securing an effective monopoly in this territory, and to
preserve its present profitable control of north-south traffic.'' 82
On reconsideration, the Commission affirmed, but permitted a
merger of two of the bus lines sought to be acquired by Southeastern in order to enable them to offer more effective competition
with the Greyhound System.83 Similarly, New England Greyhound
Lines was not allowed to purchase some of the operating rights of
Short Line because this "would cause other established services,
for the first time, to be faced with the aggressive competition of
a Greyhound Company on traffic movements" between several
New England cities.84 Short Lines primarily served several points
in Connecticut; Greyhound would join the routes purchased with
its interstate network and thus present a mortal threat to Short
Lines' local competitors, whose financial situation was anyway
precarious.85 Hence, a majority of Division 4 denied Greyhound's
application in spite of testimony that Greyhound proposed to add
early morning and late evening runs not heretofore available
and desired by some persons in the area.
In other cases Greyhound's acquisitions were approved in the
face of vigorous antitrust objections. A significant number of these

8140 M.C.C. 375 (1946).
82 Id. at 386. The evidence as to "possible improvements in service" was deemed not
sufficient to offset this.
83 45 MC.C. 185 (1946). Greyhound's application for control of the third carrier had
been withdrawn. The result of this decision could be compared to recent mergers of
independent automobile manufacturers (Nash-Hudson and Studebaker-Packard) undertaken for the purpose of saving the independents' survival in their competitive struggle
with the big three.
84 The Greyhound Corporation-Control; New England Greyhound Lines, Inc.Purchase (Portion)-The Short Line, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 197 at 224 (1953).
85 The theory of the opinion is not as clear as those discussed earlier. It is said that
approval of the application would completely change "the competitive balance in the
area" (id. at 226) and create "an oversupply of transportation service." (id. at 227) The
latter would, from an antitrust point of view, be irrelevant; but the former expresses
the policy of §7 of the Clayton Act. Compare The Greyhound Corporation-Control;
:Pacific Greyhound Lines-Control and Merger-Geronimo Lines, Inc., 56 M.C.C. 415
(1950) [merger of Pacific Greyhound and Geronimo, an intrastate carrier, disapproved
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decisions either reversed prior denials by a single division of the
Commission, or represented the views of a majority from which individual commissioners dissented. A good illustration of this intense struggle about the role of competition is the early case of
Richmond Greyhound Lines., Inc.-Control-Peninsula Transit
Corporation. 86 Greyhound's and Peninsula's operations were competitive between Washington and Richmond, Petersburg and Norfolk, although Greyhound carried more through traffic. Peninsula
concentrated on local traffic from and to Baltimore, Washington
and Richmond and many points not served by Greyhound or any
other carrier. 87 There was railroad and water transportation in the
area. 88 Yet, national advertisers for the Greyhound system testified
that "none of the other areas [served by the Greyhound system]
exceed the territory served by the Peninsula Transit Corporation
in the variety and attractiveness of its appeals." 89 A representative
of a community publicity and tourist organization in Norfolk explained that it was "almost impossible to get into that city unless
you take a bus or cross the water on the bridge." Hence, he was
"extremely anxious" to have access to the city "kept wide open for
a competitive line to come in." He had no objection to National
Trailways, or any one else other than Greyhound, but insisted it
ought not "be locked up in one company." 00 Other motor carriers,
all members of Trailways, protested on similar grounds, and even
Peninsula's president, although he preferred to sell out, admitted
that his company could maintain competition with Greyhound
and give good service. 91 Greyhound, in reply, referred to a lowering
of its operating costs and improvement of service which would result from the merger and, generally, contended that "bus competition is usually injurious rather than beneficial to the public
and, ... because a substantial competitor of motor as well as rail
carriers is the private automobile, ... [the Commission] should ...

and divestiture ordered of control unlawfully acquired; held that the proviso of 49
U.S.C. (1~52) §306(1) exempting duly authorized intrastate carrier from the requirement
of obtaining an I.C.C. certificate for interstate operations does not exempt such carriers
from the requirements of §5 relating to mergers. Id. at 433].
86 5 M.C.C. 394 (1938), affd. in 35
87 5 M.C.C. 394 at 395 (1938).
88 35 M.C.C. 555 at 560 (1940).
89 Id. at 561.
90 Id.
91 Id.

M.C.C. 555 (1940), revd. 36 M.C.C. 747 (1941).

at 562. Similar views were expressed by the town council of Virginia Beach.
at 563.
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give consideration only to public benefits resulting from applicant's control of Peninsula and ignore the fact that approval of
the application would permit applicant to acquire its sole bus
competitor and ... result in a bus monopoly." 92
Two members of Division 5 rejected this plea in language ringing with anti-monopoly fervor:
". . . in the absence of a plain declaration to that effect, it
would be unreasonable to find that Congress intended, in the
construction of the phrase 'consistent with the public interest,'
that appropriate consideration should not be given by us to
the factor of competition. Otherwise, it would seem that every
application under Section 213 [now section 5] would have
to be approved by us upon a showing by applicant therein that
it had a reputation for rendering good service, that it could
pay the purchase price, and that the latter was not excessive.
By such a yardstick, the Greyhound interests, because of their
present position and formidable and ever-increasing financial resources, would be able to proceed with ease to absorb
as many of the country's bus lines as they desired. In that connection an officer of the parent corporation· stated: 'I don't
think that we want to own all the bus lines * * * 20 percent
would be a reasonable amount for other bus lines to have
* * * we would like to avoid taking those we would lose
money on.' Although these statements were later disclaimed
as facetious, they nevertheless are entitled to consideration
in the light of the continuous expansion of the Greyhound
System during the last 10 years.'' 93
A year later the full Commission reversed and approved the
merger. They emphasized Greyhound's proposal "to provide modern equipment and improve service through elimination of coach
changes, transfer of baggage, ticket reissuance, and through better
spacing of schedules and their coordination with ... those of other
Greyhound Companies. There would also be made available such
benefits of membership in the Greyhound system as accrue from
the Greyhound Management Company ... which ... coordinates
the activities and policies of the various Greyhound Companies

Id. at 564.
Ibid. The report concluded that, in case of approval, future efforts to correct
an undesirable monopolistic bus situation by authorizing a new operator would be
foredoomed to failure. Id. at 566. Commissioner Eastman dissented (id. at 567-570) on
grounds later adopted by the whole Commission.
92

93
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in matters of financing, accounting, safety, traffic, fares, advertising, legal matters, terminal and garage construction, labor relations, personnel training, new operations, and purchases of equipment, parts, supplies and insurance." 94 Another Greyhound subsidiary developed tours by bus to historical points in Virginia,
which would be nationally advertised by special folders. Some of
Peninsula's fares would be reduced; drivers would be paid higher
wages and economies made possible by unification would increase
earnings. More than 60 witnesses from various communities served
by Peninsula had testified at further hearings in support of the
application.95 The traveling public should not be deprived of
all these benefits merely because "some elimination in competition" would "possibly" result. 96 However, competition with other
modes of transportation and with other bus lines outside of Norfolk would remain. 97 Moreover, Greyhound offered to sell to
Carolina Coach Company, one of the protestants, Peninsula's
route south of the James River between Petersburg and Suffolk;
this "would afford means of providing competitive bus service
between Richmond and Norfolk," and approval of Greyhound's
acquisition of Peninsula was, therefore, conditioned upon that
sale. 98
The contrast between this final report extolling the blessings
of the Greyhound System and the prior report which warned
against the evil consequences of letting that monster grow bigger
could hardly be more drastic. Yet, even the final report, like Commissioner Eastman's dissent in Division 5, purports to pay its respect to the competitive ideal: (1) There can be no real monopoly,
as long as there are railroads, passenger boats and, particularly,

94 36
95 Id.
96 Id.

M.C.C. 747 at 750-751 (1941).

at 751.
at 750.
97 Ibid. "Except between Richmond and Petersburg, 23 miles, Peninsula provides
the only motorbus service over its routes, approximately 600 miles, and, of the many
points served, only the terminal points of Baltimore, Washington, Richmond, Petersburg,
Suffolk and Norfolk have competitive bus service. Upon approval herein, these points
would continue to have such service except Norfolk. . . .''
98 See Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia-Purchase-Richmond Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 38 M.C.C. 347 (1942), approving the purchase by Carolina Coach Co. and rejecting
a claim by Virginia Stage Lines which wished to purchase the same operating rights.
The offer of Stage Lines did not meet the terms of the condition in the previous case.
A subsequent complaint was dismissed in Virginia Stage Lines v. United States, (W.D.
Va. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 79.
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private automobiles competing with bus lines; 99 (2) the monopolistic effect of the acquisition in a specific area can be avoided
or, at least, mitigated by restrictive conditions such as the sale by
the vendee of some of the routes of the vendor to a protestant
carrier; hence (3) competition among bus lines, though lessened,
is not eliminated. This is enough to warrant approval if-and this
seems crucial-(4) the increased efficiency of performance believed
to result from the acquisition is deemed to outweigh presumptive
perils of monopoly.
The last two points in this rationalization of the final Richmond Greyhound decision attempt to comply with the standards
approved by the Supreme Court in the McLean Trucking Co.
case.100 On the other hand, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile them with the Illinois and Southwestern Greyhound
cases discussed above.101 In any event, the latter are outnumbered
by decisions following the Richmond Greyhound pattern, which,
as a practical matter, seem to turn on the finding that substantial
advantages to be derived from the consolidation justify not a complete destruction of all competition, but a sacrifice of a substantial
part of it which would not be allowable under the antitrust laws.102
99 MOODY'S 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL (p. a26) gives the following figures
(in millions of passenger miles and percentage of total):
1956
1946
28,350 ( 4.13%)
Railroads
66,262 (18.72%)
24,900 ( 3.63%)
Buses
25,576 ( 7.73%)
25,700 ( 3.'75%)
Air lines
5,910 ( 1.67%)
605,000 (88.24%)
Private automobiles
253,570 (71.70%)
100 See text at notes 9-19 supra.
101 See text to notes 73-79 supra. The final report in the Southwestern case was
issued 11 months after the McLean decision; the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas
referred with approval to the original Richmond Greyhound case, and deplored the
reversal. See 321 U.S. 67 at 94 (1944). See also Meck and Bogue, "Federal Regulation of
Motor Carrier Unification," 50 YALE L. J. 1376 at 1393-1397 (1941).
102 Greyhound Corp.-Control-Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 57 M.C.C. 123 (1950)
[integration of Greyhound with Southeastern Greyhound and acquisition of control of
Alaga Coach Line, Inc., approved on the ground of economies in operating costs, safer
operations, etc. (id. at 150-155)]. "Effective" competition in the territory was assured by
the grant of a certificate to Trailways (id. at 140-141), and approval was conditioned by
Greyhound's obligation to "maintain and keep open the present existing junctions and
gateways, and that any terminal and traffic arrangements now in effect between Southeastern and non-Greyhound carriers shall be continued.•••" (id. at 155) A vigorous
antitrust dissent by Commissioner Lee (id. at 158-167) cited the Illinois and Southwestern
cases and noted the absence of evidence in the record that Trailways had begun operations
or, if it had, actually provided effective competition. (id. at 165) -Mr. Lee also referred
to the fact that control of Southeastern had already been acquired by Greyhound without
waiting for Commission approval and that this should not be condoned. Northland
Greyhound Lines, lnc.-Purchase-M. M. Liederback, 25 M.C.C. 109 at 112 (1939), reversing
5 M.C.C. 123 and 215 (1937). Liederback operated only small buses of old design; unlike
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Particularly noteworthy is Greyhound Gorporation-GontrolFlorida Motor Lines Gorporation103 wherein the majority gave
Greyhound authority to buy the dominant bus line in Florida,
which had twice as many route miles and twice as much equipment
as all other Florida bus lines combined. Greyhound, which already operated in Florida, intended to use this purchase to facilitate transfer of equipment from the North to Florida during the
winter tourist season. Florida was Greyhound's principal connecting carrier; hence, Greyhound urged that the merger "will merely
continue an arrangement existing over a long period and consequently will not deprive the opposing intervenors of any traffic
heretofore enjoyed, but, through national advertising and other
traffic promotional methods more travel by motorbus would be
generated for all carriers. " 104 Greyhound contended that "its very
size has permitted it to make substantial contributions to the industry as a whole through pioneering in the design and construction of motorbusses, the improvement of lubricants, fuels, and
tires, national advertising, and ... improved station and terminal
facilities." Denial would "freeze or throttle" its normal growth
Northland, he had no intrastate rights. Purchase would thus improve service. Competition
of railroads and private automobiles is a sufficient protection against extortionate fares,
and regulatory commissions may always admit newcomers if things should get out of
hand. Commissioners Lee and McManamy dissented on the grounds that the merger
would give to Greyhound a monopoly of the only through bus routes between Minneapolis
and Chicago via Wisconsin, vendor's schedule would be eliminated, and Greyhound's
fare was 20 percent higher than that of vendor. In both cases there were no protestants,
and this fact is stressed in both reports.
See also Greyhound Corp.-Control-Eastern Michigan Motorbusses, 36 M.C.C. 413
at 417 (1941), reversing 25 M.C.C. 483 at 489 (1939). Prior report had approved merger ·
of operating rights and properties of Great Lakes Motor Bus Co. into Eastern Michigan
Motorbusses and acquisition by Eastern Michigan Transportation Corp. of control of
the two merged companies, but denied Greyhound's application for permission to acquire
from Eastern Michigan Transportation the stock of E. M. Motorbusses: "The effect
of . . . [Greyhound's] acquisition would be to add a fourth Greyhound-controlled bus
line oper:;,.ting between Detroit and Toledo, and a second such line . . . between
Detroit and Kalamazoo, with no organized competition over the latter route between
Detroit and Battle Creek, other than the one railroad which owns a substantial stock
interest in Central [Greyhound]. . . . It is conceivable that the combined efforts of
these subsidiaries and friendly rail interests would be concentrated as a powerful
influence in blocking any independent efforts to provide effective competition." The
full Commission reversed because Greyhound already had a 43.4% interest in Eastern
Michigan Transportation and there was "no appreciable competition" between Motorbusses, primarily an intrastate carrier, and the other Greyhound subsidiaries referred
to by Division 5 which handle only interstate traffic. The elimination of Transportation,
a mere holding company, and acquisition of direct stock control of Motorbusses by
Greyhound, would, therefore, not affect the existing competitive situation.
10a 45 M.C.C.
104 Id. at 89.

83 (1946).
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and expansion.105 The mere assertion of such dire consequences
for Greyhound, coupled with the statement that closer alinement
with Greyhound would bring substantial advantages in economical
use and maintenance of equipment and "refinements" of better
service, apparently swayed the majority to grant the application,
which had much public support in Florida in spite of the admitted
fact that Florida Motors had been "efficiently managed." 106
The dissent emphasized that the alleged "substantial advantages" were "couched in such broad general terms as to amount to
a blank check to Greyhound to acquire any operation which it
wants." 107 Certainly, the report does not reveal much economic
evidence supporting the finding of "substantial advantages." Moreover, Florida Motors was at the end rather than in the middle of
Greyhound's routes, and, therefore, "more readily adapted to
complete independence of action with reasonable prospects of
continued successful operation ... " than the lines involved in the
Illinois and Southwestern Greyhound cases whose absorption by
Greyhound was denied on anti-monopoly grounds. 108 The dissent
thus clearly proved inconsistency with those earlier decisions. In
any event, the quantity and quality of competition which remained
after this merger was, probably, smaller than in most other cases.
The Commission itself has not been insensitive to the charge
of inconsistency. In Greyhound Corporation-Control and Merger
-Maine Central Transportation Company,1° 9 Division 4 allowed
Greyhound to acquire Maine Central which was operating at a
loss, and to assume liability for its notes. Vendor's deficit had
been borne by its parent railroad. The Antitrust Division and other
bus lines opposed the merger, invoking the Illinois and Southwestern cases. The report, citing McLean, notes that the protesting
carriers had presented no evidence that the proposed transaction
'would appreciably worsen their position, financially, or prevent
them from fulfilling their common-carrier responsibilities," and
that Greyhound was willing to accept a condition requiring it to
maintain and keep open the present use of its terminals by other
motor-bus companies for the sale of tickets and interchange of
passengers. The Illinois Greyhound case was distinguished on the
4

105 Id. at 87-88.
100 Id. at 93.
101 Id. at 95.
10s Id. at 96-97.
109 11 CCH Fed.

Car. Cas. 1[33,570 (1956).
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ground that it epitomized the Commission's policy "to deny proposed unification where monopoly in a section would be created
or extended," but denials on that basis were called for only when
"there was an affirmative showing that the available traffic would
support competitive operations, particularly as to long distance
movements." The declining traffic in the Maine Central territory
made such a showing impossible.110 This distinction correctly reflects the basic policy of the Motor Carrier Act to guard against
excessive competition by preventing oversupply of transportation.111 Hence, it may be regrettable that this has not been consistently applied. Indeed, in both the Florida and Richmond Greyhound cases mergers were approved in spite of such an "affirmative showing." Perhaps that showing was disregarded in those
cases because of the strong public support in favor of the applications.
Of course, a failure by protesting carriers to show how a proposed merger would harm their operations would usually indicate
the merger would have no anti-competitive results and, therefore,
require approval even under the anti-merger provision of the
Clayton Act.112
Greyhound's continuous expansion was thus fostered by the
Commission's merger decisions. 113 Presumably there can be no
110 In accord: Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase-R. W. Lee, 36 M.C.C.
753 at 756 (1941), Commissioner Porter dissented; The Greyhound Corp.-Purchase-B.
C. Motor Transportation, Ltd., 60 M.C.C. 643 (1954).
111See House Hearings, note 21 supra, p. 27.
112 A good example is Greyhound Corp.-Control; Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50
M.C.C. 123 (1947) (approval of acquisition of two independent bus lines). Protestant
objected that it would be cut off from all connections except Greyhound, but the routes
of the two independents were not competitive and there was no substantial interchange
between them and protestant. Simplification of corpgrate structure as a ground justifying
merger: Greyhound Corp.-Control; Southwestern Greyhound Lines-Control-Northeastern Missouri Greyhound Lines, 50 M.C.C. 441 (1948), 55 M.C.C. 540 (1949); Greyhound
Corp.-Merger-West Ridge Transportation Co. etc., 56 M.C.C. 349 (1950); Greyhound
Corp.-Control; Pacific Greyhound Lines-Control, 65 M.C.C. 347 (1955). See also PanAmerican Greyhound Lines-Control and Merger-Pan-American Bus Lines, 38 M.C.C.
433 (1942); Greyhound Corp.-Control-Pacific Greyhound Lines-Control-Oregon Motor
Stages, 55 ,M.C.C. 321 (1948) (purchase of 25% stock interest involving actual power of
control approved in the absence of any protest). Prior to Commission approval, all interested parties must be given an opportunity to be heard, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(2)(b). The
absence of protestants may, therefore, justify the inference that competitors, if any, would
not feel prejudiced .by the acquisition. Compare United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251
U.S. 417 at 449 (1920).
113 For a detailed account of all Greyhound acquisitions see MooDY's 1957 °TRANS•
PORTATION -MANUAL, pp. 1298-1300. See also County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S.
412 (1958). (Greyhound's proposed transfer of commuter service to newly-organized subsidiary not an acquisition within §5).
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quarrel with the policy of having strong and efficient nation-wide
systems of bus carriers for intercity traffic.114 However, the question arises as to whether this policy has not been carried too far
because there is no other integrated bus system comparable to
Greyhound. 115 In fact, during 1955 the Greyhound System received gross operating revenues amounting to about 62 percent
of the annual gross realized by all Class I intercity bus operators
and Greyhound buses accounted for approximately 65 percent
of the passenger miles of Class I carriers.116 This dominant position
of Greyhound117 was the basis of a complaint by the Antitrust
114 The declaration of the "National Transportation Policy" in §1 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899, note preceding 49 U.S.C. (1952) §301 states that "sound
economic conditions in transportation" should be fostered "to the end of developing,
coordinating and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway and
rail ••• adequate to meet the needs of commerce of tlie United States. • • ." For a
detailed account of the legislative history see OPPENHEIM, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
POUCY AND INTER-CAluuER. COMPETITIVE RATES 4-15 (1945).
115 The National Trailways Bus System is a voluntary association of 42 independent
intercity motorbus carriers operating in 44 states and operating in 1955 over 73,368 route
miles. Its "principal purpose is to assist its members in more effectively competing with
the Greyhound system." 59 M.C.C. 233 at 235. See TAFF, COMMERCIAL MoToR TRANSPORTA·
TION, rev. ed., pp. 598, 599 (1955). Transcontinental Bus System, Inc., a member of Trailways, incorporated in 1947, conducts long-line and local motorbus operations in the Midwest, Mid-South, Southwest and Far West. Its numerous acquisitions are described in
MOODY'S 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL, p. 1313, and 50 M.C.C. 193 (1947); 50 M.C.C.
305, 525 (1948); 55 M.C.C. 31 (1948); 57 M.C.C. 323 (1951); 59 M.C.C. 233 at 235 (1953)
(Antitrust Division's objection withdrawn when applicant-vendee agreed that presently
existing routes, junctions and gateways be maintained); 59 M.C.C. 491 (1953) and 60
M.C.C. 157 (1954). The following comparative data for 1956 are from Moody's at 1301
and 1314:
Transcontinental
Greyhound
Buses owned
938
5,879
Bus Miles Operated
79,765,368
506,852,266
Miles of routes
33,436
97,819
Gross operating revenues
$27,309,318
$243,858,608
Net
S 1,005,086
$ 29,883,147
116 Complaint (paragraph 7) in United States v. The Greyhound Corporation, Civil
Action No. 57-C-1107, filed June 27, 1957 in N.D. m. Class I intercity bus carriers are
those with annual gross operating revenues of $200,000 or more; they do not normally
compete with smaller operators whose certificated routes are few and short. Passenger
miles means the number of miles travelled by all passengers in buses operated by such
carriers.
117 For an additional example of the Commission's awareness of monopoly dangers
see West Coast Bus Lines, Ltd., Common Carrier Application, 41 M.C.C. 269 at 285 (1942)
(dissatisfaction with Greyhound's service r'Two accounts were given of continued driving,
by both Greyhound and Dollar Lines, in excess of 50 miles through several stops without
cleaning up after a passenger had become ill and vomited in a bus. A resident of Ashland,
Ore., traveling to San Francisco over Greyhound ••• on arrival late at night found that
his baggage had apparently ibeen put off in Oakland. Notwithstanding, Greyhound employees indifferently refused to do anything about it until the next day.••• Several
instances of passengers left behind at mealstops were described.'1 resulted in granting
of certificate to West Coast).
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Division charging Greyhound with violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The consent decree entered in June 1957118 forbade
Greyhound to limit or prevent any person from selling buses to
any third person, 119 to divide territories with any other bus operator, to seek or knowingly receive prices, or services in connection
with the purchase of buses or fuel which are not available to other
bus operators, to condition the use by a bus operator of any Greyhound-owned or controlled terminal upon an agreement to refrain
from competing with Greyhound or discriminate against any bus
operator in the provision of usual terminal services, to have more
than one-third representation on the board of directors of the National Bus Traffic Association, the major rate bureau in the intercity bus business, and to evict any bus operator from any Greyhound terminal on grounds other than non-compliance with reasonable tenancy agreements. In this manner the Department of J ustice sought to prevent abuse120 of the power inherent in Greyhound's bigness after the Interstate Commerce Commission had
permitted Greyhound to grow to its present size.
All told, it seems clear that the majority of the Commission
seemed inclined in the Greyhound cases to attach greater significance to present "substantial benefits" of integration than to potential future evils of monopoly, and that it was willing to pay the
price of considerable diminution of competition for bringing
118 1957
119 The

CCH Trade Cas. 1[68,'756.
complaint had charged that Greyhound "entered into contracts with General
Motors which conferred upon the defendant exclusive and preferential rights to the
purchase of buses manufactured by General Motors . • • in exchange for commitments
by defendant •.. to purchase a certain percentage of its total bus requirements from
General Motors." In 1955 an action for damages by Greyhound against General Motors
for delivery of defective buses was settled. Greyhound's president was quoted as saying
that he was "not tied to the apronstrings of any bus manufai:turer." Bus. WEEK, March
16, 1957, pp. 179, 180. New long-distance passenger buses are being manufactured by
Mack Trucks, Inc. which hope to compete with General Motors for a Greyhound order.·
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1957, p. 52:2. A complaint against General Motors for attempted
monopolization of the manufacture of buses is pending in the Eastern District of Michigan, United States v. G.M., Civil No. 15816. Apparently arrangements between General
Motors and Greyhound made in the late 1920's required Greyhound to take 75% of its
buses from G.M. The problem of monopolistic domination of a carrier by a leading
manufacturer of transportation equipment was involved in C. & R. Trans., Inc.-ControlKeeshin Freight Lines, Inc., 60 M.C.C. 173 at 200 (1954) (Fruehauf Trailer Co. permitted
to become principal preferred stockholder in reorganized and enlarged Keeshin System
subject to conditions: Fruehauf not to dispose of its stock without prior Commission approval, no person affiliated with Fruehauf to serve as director, officer or employee of the
carrier, and charter provisions requfring consent by 70% of preferred stock for certain ·
corporate. actions shall be cancelled).
120 The consent decree contains, of course, no admission of law violations on the
part of Greyhound.

1958]

MOTOR CARRIER MERGERS

1263

about what it believed to be such benefits. In some instances, the
findings in this respect were vague or disputable; 121 certainly, without elaborate and specific economic evidence relevant to this crucial point, accommodation of antitrust and regulatory policies becomes a meaningless abdication of the former in favor of the latter.
However, the Commission has always been aware of its obligation
to undertake such an adjustment and, at least in some situations,
resolved the conflict in favor of competition. Perhaps, the contradictions noted above were inevitable in the absence of more
specific legislative directions.

IV.

END-TO-END TRUCKING MERGERS

In reply to a questionnaire submitted to it in 1955 by the
Senate Select Committee on Small Business, the Commission referred to merger applications by motor carriers of property as
follows: "It is not believed that the number involving substantially
competing carriers is large. The typical transaction is the merger
or unification of connecting carriers." 122
Cooperation between such carriers is usually called "interlining." Either loaded equipment is leased by the orginating carrier to a carrier having authority in the area of the shipment's
destination, or the shipment is transferred physically from the
truck of the initial carrier to the truck of the connecting carrier for
delivery at destination by the latter.123 This practice often causes
delay; at times shipments are misplaced, and there are loss or damage claims. Hence, carriers engaged in substantial interlining between themselves may wish to eliminate these difficulties by instituting through-service; this could be done most effectively by unification of their separate and independent enterprises in what the
Supreme Court in the McLean Trucking case called an "end-to-end
consolidation. " 124 Although this would create a different entity with
normally greater strength than that possessed by its constituent

121 The Florida case, text to note 107 supra; the Liederback case, note 102 supra.
Compare the detailed findings on this point in the McLean Trucking case, text to notes
IO and 11 supra.
122 Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra, p. 330. Emphasis supplied.
123 Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 358.
124 Note 13 supra. See also 38 M.C.C. 137 at 144 (1942): "The carriers involved [in
the merger challenged by McLean Trucking Co.] at present interchange a substantial
amount of freight between themselves and with other carriers." For a detailed enumeration of the inefficiency and inexpedience of interlining, see Adams Report, note 58 supra,
pp. 358-361.
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parts prior to unification, the nature of the operation would remain
substantially the same as before except for the improvement resulting from through-service. By contrast, unification of carriers with
no or- negligible previous interchange arrangements would present
a very different picture of an entirely new service where none had
existed before. The danger of diversion of traffic from competitors
is likely to be greater in the latter type of merger than in the
former; indeed, in the former there might be only little or no
diversion. Of course, under the McLean Trucking formula the
Commission must determine whether public advantage from improved performance made possible by a merger is more important
than reduction of competition, if any; hence, we might expect that
end-to-end consolidations of interlining carriers could be approved
more readily than other mergers.
These considerations are reflected in the leading case of Pacific
Intermountain Express Co.-Control and Purchase-Keeshin
Freight Lines, Inc. 125 Pacific, hereafter referred to as P.I.E., was
in 1950 operating over 10,513 regular routes in the area between
the California coast and Chicago and St. Louis. It owned 756
units of equipment, had leased 79 additional units for long-term
use. It maintained terminals in most of the cities in its territory,
and the average length of its hauls was 1500 miles. Its average
shipment weighed 660 pounds, and its operating revenue had
increased from $1,000,000 in 1941 to $14,000,000 in 1949.
The Keeshin System, which P.I.E. sought to acquire, coveted
15,560 miles in territory extending from Minneapolis, Des Moines
and St. Louis to Boston and Washington, D.C. It owned 1,412 uniu.
of equipment, and the average length of its haul was 215 miles.
Its operating revenues were smaller than those of P .I.E., but
substantial.126
The two systems come together in Chicago and St. Louis, but
the volume of freight interchanged between them was "negligible."
However, P.I.E. interlined considerable freight with Keeshin's
motor carrier competitors who opposed the merger. There was no
doubt that all east-bound freight delivered by P.I.E. to these protestants at Chicago and St. Louis would be lost by them in case

125 57 -M.C.C. 341 (1950), affd. 57 M.C.C. 467
· 126 $10,500,000 is the figure for 1950 given in

(1951).
the Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 43.
Net income after taxes for P.I.E. and Keeshin in 1949 was $1,000,755 and $142,834 respectively. 57 M.C.C. 341 at 347 and 351 (1950).
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of approval; 127 by the same token, P.l.E. would be in a position to
divert to itself west-bound traffic which it now receives from eastern carriers.128 The twelve protesting motor carriers indicated that
this would disrupt the competitive balance in their eastern territories; some of them explicitly stated that they could not survive these inevitable consequences of the proposed merger. 129
Similarly, protesting railroads competing with P .I.E. and Keeshin
expressed apprehension that the transaction would deprive them
of vitally needed transcontinental traffic. 130
The Commission denied approval on the ground that the proposal
"goes beyond a mere unification of the operations of two going concerns, with the elimination of interchange formerly
carried on between them. As stated, there has been no appreciable amount of traffic interchanged between P .I.E. and
the Keeshin Companies. To the extent that P.I.E. would
institute a single-line, single ownership, through operation
between points now served by it and points now served by
... Keeshin ... it would be a new competitive service, not
distinguishable, to this extent, from an extension of its service
through securing new operating authority. It would be a new
service competitive with existing carriers operating wholly
within the respective territories now served by P .I.E. and . . .
Keeshin . . . , depriving those carriers of traffic which they
now transport and interchange, and would also be competitive with existing carriers which operate between points in
the territory served by P .I.E. on the one hand, and points in
· territory served by ... Keeshin ... on the other, through the
rendition of a through service not heretofore available." 131
The denial was affirmed on reconsideration. The Commission
noted that "public interest" under section 5 was not necessarily
identical with the requirement of "public convenience and necessity" under section 207 of the Interstate Commerce Act132 for
127 57 M.C.C. 341 at 379 (1950).
12s Id. at 376.
129 Id. at 371-377.
130 Id. at 368-371. The American Trucking Associations took the position that the
railroads are not entitled to protection against motor carrier competition, 57 M.C.C.
467 at 468 (1951).
13157 M.C.C. 341 at 379, 380 (1950).
132 49 U.S.C. (1952) §307. A real distinction is pointed out in McLean Trucking Co.
v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 at 78, 79 (1944) (inadequacy of existing service is not a
prerequisite for approval of a merger, but, usually, must be shown before certificates
may be granted to newcomers).
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grants of certificates; the statement in the prior report that authorization of this merger would be tantamount to certification of an
extension of service for P .I.E. should, therefore, not be understood
as blurring the distinction. Rather, it was intended to stress the
Commission's duty in merger cases
"to consider . . . if such proposed new unified service would
adversely affect to any substantial extent the continuance,
efficiency, and economy of existing carrier services, to tlie
detriment of the public, whether it would result in offsetting
advantages to the public and whether approval or disapproval
would more nearly conform with the policy of Congress declared in the national transportation policy."133
In this instance, elimination of interchange expense and delay,
reduction in insurance c_osts and other economies and greater
job security for employees134 were deemed insufficient to offset the
threat to other efficient motor carriers by consolidation of two so
dissimilar operations as P .I.E. and Keeshin. Commissioner Knudson suggested in a concurring opinion that the creation of a transcontinental trucking system run by what would become "one of
the nation's largest and most powerful motor carriers" was disturbing in its effects "upon certain well-developed American
concepts ... relating to so-called 'antitrust policies.' " 135
Although the anti-merger law was not mentioned, and the
two companies sought to be merged were not in competition with
each other, the denial of P.I.E.'s ·application was based on the
idea that a new service would be created with the probability,
nay certainty, of a substantial lessening of competition in the
eastern territory served by Keeshin. The evidence as to the diversion of traffic with possibly lethal effects of the transaction on the
protesting motor carriers was ample, and the Commission considered it thoroughly. In other words, on this record it was easy
to conclude that the showing as to the anti-competitive effects
outweighed advantages to shippers from the institution of through
service; indeed, there was no shipper support for this application.
The Commission has been charged with erosion of the doctrine
of this case by subsequently permitting P .I.E., already a leader in
183 57
134 Id.
135 Id.

M.C.C. 467 at 470 (1951).
at 359-361.
at 474. Mr. Knudson observed tbat no such system existed in 1940 when the
national transportation policy was declared. Greyhound did exist tben. See text at note
70 supra.
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the industry, 136 to acquire several carriers operating in its western
territory. 137 However, the Commission's reports in those later
P .I.E. cases indicate that there was support by the shippers and
no evidence as to adverse effect of the transactions there proposed
on competing protestants.138 In fact, section 5 cases involving other
companies seeking to institute single-line through service have
followed the P.l.E.-Keeshin doctrine by denying approval in analogous situations.139 The notion that a proposed unification would
136 In the third quarter of 1956, P.I.E. occupied second place in gross earnings and
first place in net earnings among general freight carriers. S. Hearings Before Select
Committee on Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st
sess., p. 8 (1957).
137 Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 262, and cases discussed on pp. 262-270. See also
pp. 225, 226.
138 The most important of these mergers was P.I.E.-Control-West Coast Fast Freight,
Inc., 60 M.C.C. 301 at 318-319 (1954), Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 263, 264.
Protestants proposed restrictions to preclude interlining between vendor and vendee at
points served by protestants, which applicants accepted. Some of the companies acquired
were not carriers of general freight. In MC-F-5984 (Adams Report, pp. 264, 265), protestant
was a large carrier, whose size and financial strength was deemed sufficient to enable it
to make the necessary adjustments. In MC-F-6199 (Adams Report, pp. 268, 269) it was
said "that the mere apprehension by competing carriers that they might lose some
traffic does not alone warrant denial. . . ." The protests of railroads in all these cases
were disregarded. Shippers supported the applicants.
139 E. W. King-Control; The Mason &: Dixon Lines, Inc.-Purchase-W. D. Sartain
and J. R. O'Guin, 60 M.C.C. 331 at 353, 354 (1954), reversing prior report in 58 M.C.C.
301 (1952) (authority to purchase operating rights denied; not every shipper entitled
to direct single-line service to all points when prompt service is being provided). "Cook
[protestant] not only would lose the westbound traffic it now receives from Mason &:
Dixon, which, during the first 6 months of 1952, aggregated almost 940 tons, but most
of the traffic moving between Nashville and Memphis, constituting 48 per cent of its
system tonnage and 48 per cent of its system gross operating revenues •.. would become
vulnerable to Mason &: Dixon's solicitation." Similar figures were given as to other
protestants. Fay V. Watson-Control; Watson Bros. Transport Co.-Purchase (Portion)West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 745 at 759 (1951); A. B. Crichton, Sr.-Control;
Super Service Motor Freight Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 60
M.C.C. 389 (1954) (denying purchase of operating rights on authority of P.I.E.-Keeshin
case). Complaint by applicant-vendee dismissed in Super Service Motor Freight Co. v.
United States and I.C.C., 10 F.C.C. 80,995 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) [plaintiff wanted to purchase
a portion of Hayes' rights to obtain direct single-line through-service between eastern
points and Memphis, via Nashville, to alleviate congested terminal conditions at Nash.
ville. Div. 4 approved (57 M.C.C. 715), the full Commission reversed (58 M.C.C. 137),
then reversed itself and reinstated the approval, but finally, on the basis of detailed
evidence adduced by new protestants, denied (60 ,M.C.C. 389)]. These vacillations indicate
the desirability for immediate protests and presentation of evidence by all affected
competitors. Cf. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co.-Purchase-Boulder Truck Service, Inc.,
12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,802 (1956) (fact that interlining developed between applicants
subsequent to commencement of negotiations for sale of rights deemed irrelevant.
Protests by railroads serving all points in the territory held sufficient, even in absence
of showing of possible losses); J. E. Faltin-Purchase (Portion)-C. B. Gray, 50 M.C.C.
364 at 370 (1948); E.W.A. Peake-Control; Consolidated Freightways, Inc.-Purchase
(Portion)-Arrowhead Freight Lines, 59 M.C.C. 165 at 184 (1953): "Vendee, a financially
stronger carrier than vendor, which has performed a limited service in the territory and
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bring about a radical change of service which would threaten competition was also stressed as a ground for denying applications by
regular-route vendees and vendors operating over irregular
routes.140
As noted above, these denials rest on the factual determination
or, rather, prognostication in each case that competitors as a group
could not long survive consummation of the transaction and that
the reasonable needs of shippers are taken care of. At this point,
the antitrust policy of section 7 of the Clayton Act and the regulatory purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to prevent oversupply of motor~carrier service seem to coincide: The elimination
of competitors would lead to monopoly, and, until that is achieved,
the struggle among rivals for the available business would become
so fierce that service would deteriorate. The Commission has the
duty to prevent this.

over the routes involved, would doubtless conduct a more aggressive operation and
attract substantial traffic now enjoyed by [protestants], which they can ill afford to lose.
No evidence was submitted which would indicate that vendee expects to develop new
sources of tonnage and it is therefore logical to conclude that the traffic anticipated would
be diverted from protestants and other carriers operating in the area." For more recent
decisions involving Consolidated Freightways and numerous pending applications for
approval, see I.C.C. 70th ANN. REP. 77, and 71st ANN. REP. 55. See also Amer. Red Ball
Transit-Purchase-B & H Transfer and Storage, 9 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[32,408 (1952).
Evidence shows "that intervenors, especially Rocky Ford, cannot well afford to lose any
of the business they now enjoy, particularly California freight destined to Eastern points."
The case is criticized in Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 371-373. Among the protestants
were most of the major nationwide van lines, who did not need protection, and a carrier
should not be denied to take the risk of competition. The latter ground may be inconsistent with the regulatory theory of the act to prevent excessive competition from oversupply of transportation. The former, in connection with the sentence quoted above,
may indicate that the Commission feared the destruction of smaller competitors; in any
event, the Commission's explanation should have ,been more elaborate on this point.
140 Shein's Express-Purchase (Portion)-W. Stillwell, 56 M.C.C. 711 at 714 (1950):
"Vendees have been interlining with connecting carriers at Philadelphia :between 30,000
and 60,000 pounds of south-bound traffic per day ... were the transaction to be ..• consummated, existing carriers would lose substantially all of the traffic now received by them
from vendees at Philadelphia.•.." Appeal against denial dismissed in Shein v. United
States, (D.C. N.J. 1951) 102 F. Supp. 320 (vendee-plaintiff proposed radical change in vendor's pattern of operations; plaintiff could not have qualified for certificate of convenience
and necessity, should not attain same end by indirection through merger). In accord:
Falwell v. United States, (W.D. Va. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 71, affd. per curiam 330 U.S. 807
(1947) [complaint to set aside I.C.C. order (40 M.C.C. 439) dismissed]; Houff Transfer,
Inc. v. United States, (W.D. Va. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 851. The Commission defined carriers
with irregular routes radial service as persons undertaking transportation "from a fixed
base point or points or places located within such radial area as shall have been . • •
authorized .•• or from any point within such radial area to such carrier's fixed base
point or points." Regular route service is transportation between fixed termini. Falwell
v. United States, supra, 69 F. Supp. at 77. See 49 U.S.C. (1952) §304(b) authorizing the
Commission to establish "reasonable classifications • • • of groups of carriers.''
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It follows that mergers or purchases of operating rights will
be approved in those cases where no threat to the survival of protesting competitors is found, 141 and this, as noted earlier, is likely,
though not limited to situations where interlining of traffic between vendor and vendee preceded their application. Thus, in
Baltimore Transfer Co. v. I.C.C. 142 plaintiffs' complaint to set
aside approval of a purchase was dismissed. Vendee, Quinn Freight
Lines, "one of the larger motor carriers operating along the Eastern Seaboard" as a common carrier of general commodities over
regular routes from Boston to Baltimore, transported volume
shipments destined to Washington, D.C., Richmond, and other
points in Virginia. Vendors' (Neale and Wadkins) routes covered
the territory from Baltimore to Virginia. Half a million pounds
a week, amounting to one fifth of vendee's total tonnage moving
south through Baltimore, was there interlined with one of the
vendors; hence, the proposed purchase would eliminate delays,
losses and damage. Shippers supported the application, but plaintiffs, carriers competing with vendors, protested; they urged that
their service was adequate, they could accommodate additional
freight and would lose substantial traffic. Observing that competition in the territory was substantial, but that vendors' operations
have had little consequence for plaintiffs-protestants, the court
said:
"The opposing carriers do not serve directly a very large
portion of the area in the five Virginia counties embraced in
Neale's certificate. They have no interline freight with vendors and not much with Quinn, the vendee, Brooks [one of
the plaintiffs] having received only some 80,000 pounds from
the latter between January 1 and June 30, 1951. Complete
data was not given with respect to the volume of New England
141 In J. W. Ringsby-Control; Ringsby Trucklines, Inc.-Control-Northem Transportation Co., 58 M.C.C. 594 at 598 (1952), the Com.mission said: "We do not consider
the views expressed in the PIE case as necessarily requiring denial of every section 5
application, merely because a single-line through service would result, and because competing carriers contend that they would be adversely affected by such a service. The
right to perform single-line through service results from every physical unification of
rights where a common point is served. Each case can and must be determined on the
basis of the evidence of record, and where ••• the record affirmatively establishes that
the proposed plan of operations would meet a public need and that the public interest
would best be served by the proposed common control, the application may properly
be approved, especially where the competing carriers have failed to establish that their
operations or services would be prejudiced to any material degree."
142 (D.C. Md. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 558, affd. per curiam 346 U.S. 890 (1953), rehearing
den. 347 U.S. 908 (1954).

1270

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

tonnage which East Coast and Transfer [the other plaintiffs]
interline. Out of more than three and one-half million pounds
transported by Brooks to or from Richmond, on three days in
1951, only a little more than 100,000 pounds originated at
or was destined to points in Connecticut, Massachusetts and
Rhode Island. The bulk of vendee's tonnage originates in
Massachusetts, and the opposing carriers have shared very
little in the portion moving into vendors' territory." 143
Under these circumstances, while it was "quite likely that Quinn,
the vendee, being an aggressive carrier, will divert some freight
from the opposing carriers, this fact alone is not sufficient reason
for denying the application; and weighing the evidence on both
sides the Commission stated it was not convinced that operations
by Quinn, the vendee, under the unified rights would so hurt
the opposing carriers as to impair their ability to continue performing their obligations as common carriers." 144
Indeed, the court endorsed the Commission's rejection of
plaintiffs' contention that the proposed transaction would not be
in the public interest because it would take some business away
from them: "As to this, suffice it to say that it is not inconsistent
with the public interest if, in order to provide the public with
improved service, such would affect adversely the revenue of a
protesting carrier."145
The distinction between adverse effect on protestants' revenues
on the one hand and impairment of ability to continue as common carriers on the other seems to be crucial; the former is con143 114 F. Supp. 558 at 563. On p. 562 the court, summarizing the (unreported)
findings of the Commission, states that plaintiff Transfer "would be subject to sub•
stantial competition from vendee," but that Transfer has been successful in spite of
"substantial carriers whose routes practically parallel its own."
144 Id. at 563. Emphasis added.
145 Id. at 564-565, citing Trans-American Freight Lines, Inc.-Purchase-H. D. Gorman, 5 M.C.C. 712 (1938); Super Service Motor Freight Co.-Purchase-Selman & Junkins,
45 M.C.C. 432 (1947) and N.C. Purdie Corp.-Purchase (Portion)-Hoffman's Motor
Transportation, 57 M.C.C. 790 (1951). The court also approved the granting of temporary
authority to Quinn pursuant to §210a(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act in view of the
fact that Neale had died and his widow was unable to carry on the trucking business.
The purchases approved in Eastern Freightways, 60 M.C.C. 133 at 136 (1954), and Anderson ,Motor Service v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 577 at 581, were similarly
motivated. Truckers in their fifties and sixties with all their assets tied up in the business
frequently try to sell out to other lines. See S. Hearings Before Select Committee on
Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 160
(1957). See also Stone's Express Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1954) 122 F. Supp.
955, dismissed as moot 350 U.S. 906 (1955) [limitation of temporary authority to maximum
duration of 180 days (49 U.S.C. (1952) §310a(b)) not superseded by Administrative
Procedure Act §9b. 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1008(b)].
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sistent with a finding that the proposed end-to-end unification
increases while the latter lessens competition.146 Accordingly, the
Commission has rationalized its approval of numerous acquisitions
of this type on the theory that opposing carriers are not entitled
to immunity from competition; hence, their protests have no merit
when, in addition to the obvious advantage to shippers resulting
from elimination of interlining, present and potentially available
business in the area is sufficient to stimulate them into making the
necessary adjustments to a more vigorous competitive situation.147

146 See the explanation by Dr. Adams that vertical or end-to-end mergers may either
increase or lessen competition in S. Hearings, note 145 supra, p. 205.
147 Anderson Motor Service, Inc. v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 577
at 581 (protestants' efficiency shown by low operating ratios and rising profits); WasieControl; Merchants Motor Freight, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Bridgeways, Inc., 60 M.C.C.
229 at 278-280 (1954) (P.I.E. case distinguished, support by numerous shippers, active
and continuous interlining, protestant motor carriers had improved their operating
ratios and increased their assets, protests by railroads (pp. 269-271) disregarded); Sutherland&: Palmer-Control; Middle Atlantic Trans. Co.-Purchase (Portion)-United Trucking
Co., 7 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[31,936 (1950) (competitors are large, in five months of vendee's
operation under temporary authority intervenors had lost only one account); PruckaPurchase (Portion)-Overnite Express, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 69 at 76 (1950) (usual formula
that some competing carriers will lose some traffic when a larger or more aggressive
carrier takes over operations of a smaller one); Interstate Motor Lines-Control and
Merger-Great American Dispatch, Inc., 58 M.C.C. 775 (1953) (not a "new" service
because of substantial interlining between vendor and vendee, no adverse effect on
protestants); Arkansas Motor Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Smock Transp. Co.,
55 M.C.C. 701 (1949) and A. B. Crichton-Control; Super Service Motor Freight Co.Purchase-Selman &: Junkins, 45 M.C.C. 432 (1947) (same, no evidence that available
traffic would not support single-line through service in addition to services of other
carriers, "some increase in competition in the area may result"); Keeshin-Control;
Conklin Truck Line, Inc.-Purchase-Wilhelm Transport Co., 59 M.C.C. 763 at 775-776
.(1954) (merger between carriers connecting at Chicago approved in spite of very little
previous interlining between vendor and vendee; protestants would face new competition
only at some points); Mid-Continent Freight Lines-Purchase-Hanson Motor Express,
Inc., 65 M.C.C. 312 (1955) (vendee's regular routes connected with those of vendor for
the eastbound delivery of specified commodities at 6 towns and for westbound delivery
of general commodities at the same towns. "[V]endee now authorized to deliver and
pick-up shipments at St. Louis and the principal points served by vendor, ••• acquisition of the rights of vendor would not permit it to render any greater service at St.
Louis. . • •" P.I.E. case distinguished, protestants' operations have been increasingly
profitable, their fears are "speculative and conjectural"); Wieck-Control; St. LouisNashville Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Ziffrin Truck Lines, 59 M.C.C. 339 (1953)
and Navajo Freight Lines-Purchase-M. M. Comstock, 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,657
(1956) (protestants larger than vendee, hence their objections seem groundless); DalbyControl; T.I.M.E., Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-W. 0. Harrington, 60 M.C.C. 381 at 387
(1954), reversing 59 M.C.C. 621 (1953), Commissioner Mahaflie dissenting (no interlining
prior t9 beginning of merger-negotiations, :but "increased competition would be likely
to stimulate all carriers in this area toward a more efficient and improved service and
thereby attract additional traffic over comparatively new and desirable routes to the
ultimate benefit of all participating carriers"). Emphasis added. Ringsby Truck Lines,
Inc.-Control-Northern Transport Co., 58 M.C.C. 594 at 598 (1952), affirming 58 M.C.C.
235 (1952) (failure of protestants to show material prejudice); D.C. Hall Co.-Purchase-
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By the same token, railroads have no standing to complain about
approval of a motor-carrier acquisition on the sole ground that
"the motor carriers ... as a combination under joint control with
adequate financial backing, offer stronger competition to the railroads than they did previously."148
The difficulty of determining in many cases whether approval
of a proposed acquisition would merely make things tougher for
competitors rather than threaten them with extinction should be

Hall and Hall Transport, Inc., 70 M.C.C. 233 (1956) (same); Watson Brothers Transp.
Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Powell Brothers Trucklines, 57 M.C.C. 661 at 671 (1951)
(vendor's rights not dormant when he operated "on a scale commensurate with its
financial resources, facilities, and the traffic tendered to it." Protestants "ability to continue to perform their common-carrier obligations" not affected); Garrett Freightlines,
Inc.-Purchase-The Moab Garage Co., 58 M.C.C. 757 at 772-773 (1953) (protestants'
operating ratios, revenues and connections with other carriers found such as to preclude
serious detriment to them). Finding of Div. 4 that vendee could not bear financial
burdens of the transaction reversed in 59 M.C.C. 615 at 618 (1953); Boyd Truck Lines,
Inc.-Purchase-Denver-Limon-Burlington Transfer Co., 65 M.C.C. 433 (1955), modifying
65 -M.C.C. 75 (1955) (prior report approved purchase subject to condition that unified
rights should exclude right to transport shipments originating at Kansas City, destined
to Denver or points beyond, or originating at Denver destined to Kansas City. On
reconsideration, majority eliminated this condition on the ground that opposing carriers
do not need this protection. P.I.E. was one of the protestants. Bruce Motor Freight,
Inc.-Purchase-Pittsley, 65 M.C.C. 563 (1955) (purchase approved subject to concurrent
cancellation of some of the acquired rights and condition barring vendee from utilizing
rights for transportation between Chicago, Twin Cities and St. Louis); Trans-American
Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Allen Motor Lines, 65 M.C.C. 163 (1955), reversing
59 M.C.C. 695 (1953) (purchase approved with restrictions as to territory in spite of
absence of prior interlining between applicants, shippers complain about delays and
loss due to interchange and protestants, ·"substantial and well established carriers,"
should be stimulated by increased competition to render improved service); Baggett
Transportation Co.-Purchase-Hunt Freight Lines, 70 M.C.C. 169 (1956) (purchase approved with restrictions to protect competitors handling satisfactorily all available
traffic between Chattanooga and Atlanta, detailed discussion of precedents to the effect
that restrictions on operating rights in §5 cases "tend to create problems of interpretation
and operating complications" and should not be imposed "unless clearly justified"). See
also Moland-Purchase-Saunders and Welty, 39 M.C.C. 321 at 326 (1943), reversing 38
M.C.C. 625 (1942), on the basis of new evidence as to competitive conditions in the area.
In Clyde-Control; Service, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Yeary Transfer Co., 59 M.C.C.
517 at 527 (1953), a purchase of interstate rights of a connecting carrier which had interlined substantial traffic with vendee approved against the objection that the transaction
would result in separation of vendor's interstate and intrastate rights. The Commission's
jurisdiction under §5 to entertain applications by interstate carriers for authority to
purchase properties of a carrier operating physically within one state but whose activities
involve transportation in interstate commerce between places within such state under
an intrastate certificate was sustained in Baggett Transportation Co. v. United States,
(N.D. Ala. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 167.
148Atchison, Topeka &: Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1955) 130 F.
Supp. 76 at 79, affd. per curiam 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rehearing den. 350 U.S. 943 (1956).
The court observed (at p. 78) that there were no allegations of present or threatened
financial injury. Alton Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942), was distinguished
on the ground that it involved a Commission order granting new operating rights.
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obvious. A good illustration is St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.-Purchase-Hinsch Transportation Co.149 That transaction involved
common carrier operations in New England, New York and northern New Jersey. Vendor, who sought to sell because of poor health
and recurring deficits, operated between the New York-New Jersey
area and Boston, where it interchanged most of its traffic with
one of the protestants and only "occasionally ... some shipments
with vendee." 150 Much of its tonnage was transported in semitrailers loaded on railroad flatcars. Vendee's operations were conducted
principally north of Boston and Springfield, where it interchanged with other carriers. This has not been satisfactory with
respect to less than truckloads, and approval of the purchase would
enable vendee to institute through-service from northern New
England to New Jersey. Moreover, vendor's preponderant northbound traffic could be balanced with vendee's predominant southbound shipments.151 Representatives of nine shippers with plants
in Maine, Vermont and New Jersey supported the application. 152
Numerous competing motor carriers appeared in opposition,
submitting operating statistics as to revenues and expenses. Division 4 devoted ten printed pages of its report to a summary of these
data.153 Only two of the protestants admitted that they had no
reason to fear losses.154 One other showed that since the grant of
temporary authority to vendee155 it had "lost 80 percent of the
traffic moving to and from vendee's northern New England area
to points in the area served under vendor's rights.... A maximum
of 20 percent of its equipment is now idle." 156 Most of the opposing
carriers had high operating ratios, and many could handle more
traffic. All claimed that an entirely new service would be established. Accordingly, a majority of Division 4 denied the application
on the ground that "intense competition" exists in the area, "carriers have expended their energy and resources in developing
149 59 M.C.C. 419 (1953) (approval denied in 2-1 decision); reversed and approved,
subject to conditions 59 M.C.C. 747 (1954), modified 60 M.C.C. 129 (1954), complaint
dismissed M. &: M. Transportation Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 128 F. Supp.
296, affd. per curiam 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
150 59 M.C.C. 419 at 427 (1953).
151 Id. at 428-429.
152 Id. at 431-434.
153 Id. at 434-444.
154 Id. at 435 and 437.
155 See Stone's Express Co. v. United States, (D.C. -Mass. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 955.
156 59 M.C.C. 419 at 440-441 (1953). The figures quoted in the text pertained to
M. &: M. Transportation Co., which later sued to set aside the approval, note 149 supra.
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facilities to handle all available traffic, and . . . they are rendering
an adequate service," and "are entitled to protection against .
•
a new service.
. . ."157
On reconsideration, the full Commission said that "most of
the carriers had increased their operating revenues and net income in 1948, and it does not appear that they have or would
lose sufficient traffic as a result of the transaction to affect materially their operations. . . . [T]he traffic in the territory is ample
to support continuation of a part of vendor's operations as unified
with those of vendee, as well as the operations of competing carriers."158 Accordingly, the application was approved on the condition that all operating rights not used by vendor should be
cancelled.159 The subsequent complaint of the protestant carrier
most affected by the transaction was dismissed on the usual ground
that there was substantial, though conflicting evidence to support
the Commission's findings, and strict consistency with its prior
decisions was not required of the Commission.160
The reversal of the initial report of Division 4 was not based
on new evidence. Hence, the bare statement of diametrically opposite conclusions drawn from the same record by the full Commission is regrettable because of its failure to explain "why the
change of attitude came about" 161 after the delay and expense of
protracted hearings and rehearings. That change involved the key
question of the Commission's economic regulation: "How does
it determine the limits of permissible competition?" 162 To be sure,
a reasoned answer is not necessary where the evidence seems conclusive that protestants would be destroyed or that their ability
to continue as common carriers would not be affected, as in the
Baltimore Transfer Co. case discussed above. 163 But in St. Johns1111 Id. at 445-446.
158 59 M.C.C. 747 at 758-759 (1954).
159 Id. at 759, 761, 762. The condition was later made more strict by requiring cancellation of all of vendor's operating rights except those which "would permit an operation between vendee's existing rights in northern New England, on the one hand, and
on the other, points in the involved New York-New Jersey area.'' 60 M.C.C. 129 at 130
(1954). Thus, the Commission met the protestants half-way. See Adams Report, note 58
supra, pp. 294-296.
160 M. & M. Transportation Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 296
at 301, and cases cited. Accord, Anderson Motor Service v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1957)
151 F. Supp. 577 at 581.
161 Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 356. The criticism quoted in the text referred
to another decision, but is repeated throughout the report.
162 Ibid. Emphasis added.
163See text at note 143 supra. The evidence in the McLean Trucking case was also
clear on this point.
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bury Trucking Go. reasqnable men differed about the evaluation
of the evidence as indicated by the different results reached by
Division 4 and the full Commission. The Federal Motor Carrier
Act was intended to prevent "over-competition" leading to depressed rates, or deterioration and ultimate disappearance of services, but not intense or "constructive" competition.164 Hence, the
ultimate rejection of the protests of St. Johnsbury's competitors
presented an opportunity to elucidate the Commission's approach
in close cases as to how it defines both concepts, what criteria, if
any, it uses to distinguish the latter from the former and what
evidence protestants must present in order to convince the Commission that an oversupply of motor-carrier service is threatened.
The Commission has been criticized for its failure to develop a
clear, practical and consistent philosophy with respect to these
difficult questions; 165 its interpretation of section 5 in general terms,
as approved in the McLean Trucking Go. case, certainly does not
help solving specific, complicated and ambiguous situations.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that both the

164 Statement of Commissioner A. F. Arpaia, Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra,
p. 166. Commissioner Owen Clarke, testifying before the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 101
(1957), said: "If it [competition] results in more economical and better service to the
public by increasing competition, then we are for it. If increasing competition adversely
affects the quality of service and the price of the service, then, in following out the
national transportation policy, we are opposed ·to increased competition in those instances ••• there are two kinds of competition: Constructive competition and destructive
competition. The national transportation policy explicitly states we should prohibit or
prevent what might be called destructive competition."
165 Adams Report, note 58 supra, passim. Testimony of Dr. Adams in S. Hearings
Before Select Committee on Small Business (Trucking ,Mergers and Concentrations) 85th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 133 (1957). Law and Ingham Trans. Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Woodberry, 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,278 (1955), is an example of inconsistency as pointed
out in the Adams Report, pp. 270-275, 284, 285. On facts similar to St. Johnsbury, application of a small carrier was denied; applicants urged that protestants had failed to
show their volume of traffic or their shippers which might be subject to competition by
vendees, nor any actual losses during temporarily authorized operations by vendee.
Division 4 was satisfied by the fact that protestants' operating ratios had become less
favorable. Compare Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Carleton [authority
for vendee (operating in 30 states) to purchase small trucker owning 5 pieces of equipment denied three times on the ground that reactivation of sporadically exercised rights
would result in new service] 58 M.C.C. 814 (1952), 60 M.C.C. 415 (1954), 65 M.C.C. 331
(1955), reversed and granted, 4 Commissioners dissenting, 65 M.C.C. 781 (1956) (mere
apprehensions of competing carriers no ground for denial in absence of proof that
additional competition would seriously impair their services; competition among household goods carriers different from other industries since individual shippers may make
long-distance move only once or twice in a life-time; vendor's sporadic operations were
consistent with his resources). See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 350-356, for a detailed
account of this case.
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total ton-miles of regulated carriers of property and the truckers'
percentage of that total increased spectacularly in recent years. 166
At the same time, full or partial approvals of section 5 applications outnumbered denials by 3 to 1.167 Hence, the Commission
may be correct in claiming that "many of these mergers have
added to the efficiency of the trucking industry" 168 and, in fact,
brought about "increased competition" by mak~ng "a single company which has greater stability and dependability from a financial
standpoint better able to compete with the thousands of other
motor carriers and railroads." 169 However, this does not dispense
with the desirability of furnishing clearer directional lines as to
where the line should be drawn between excessive and reasonable
competition.

V. ACQUISITION OF DORMANT OPERATING RIGHTS
The question whether to protect competitors against destructive competition or expose them to constructive competition has
been particularly troublesome in the determination of applications for authority to acquire control or purchase operating rights
of a vendor who has not exercised all or some of his rights or has
rendered sporadic services only for some time. 170 It is settled that
cessation of operations does not necessarily or automatically cause
a revocation or lapse of an operating authority previously granted

166!.C.C. 70th ANN. REP. 45 (Nov. 1, 1956): "The increase of 18.1% in ton miles
from 1949 to 1955 for the railroads ... compares with increases of 56.8% for regulated
motor carriers...." The railroads' ton miles increased 86.3% from 1939-1955, but their
share of the total declined from 62.4% to 49%. Motor vehicle tonnage during the same
period increased 328%, and ... share of the total rose from 9.7 to 17.7%. Id., p. 43.
Total intercity ton-miles (all modes of transportation) were as follows: 543.5 billion
(1939), 915.8 billion (1949), 1,277.8 billion (1955), id., p. 44. It is estimated that in 1957
intercity trucks hauled 260 billion ton-miles of freight, 6 billion more than in 1956. N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 97:1: "Trucks capture 19% of freight." Comparison of 1955 with
1956 shows percentages of total <ton-miles: railroads decreased from 49.41 to 48.22; motor
carriers increased from 17.7 to 18.66. I.C.C. 71st ANN. REP. 10 (1957).
16'1' From the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act through 1955 the Commission
granted 4,510 and denied 1,216 applications. Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra,
p. 329. During the period Nov. 1, 1955 to Oct. 31, 1956, 271 applications were granted
and 50 denied. I.C.C. 70th ANN. REP. 78 (1956).
168 Commissioner Mitchell in S. Hearings, note 165 supra, p. 103.
169 Commissioner Clarke, id. at 102.
170 Some of the rights of vendor in the St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. case were
dormant; text to note 159 supra; rights are not considered as "dormant" when operations
thereunder were on a scale commensurate with the carrier's facilities. See Watson
Brothers Transp. Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Powell Brothers Truck Lines, 57 M.C.C.
661 (1951).
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by the Commission.171 Consequently, the holder of dormant rights
may either himself resume their exercise or sell them. If he does
the latter, the problems discussed above with reference to acquisition of active rights take on added complexity because other
carriers are likely to claim that they have filled the void which
occurred when vendor ceased operations by expansion of their
own facilities. Substantiation of such a claim may have the doublebarrelled effect of showing that shippers do not need such a purchase and that competitors could not long survive its consummation; opposing carriers might even invoke the P.l.E.-Keeshin doctrine that vendee is seeking the institution of a new service.
The Commission has denied many applications for the purchase of dormant rights. A significant illustration is Herrin Transportation Co. v. United States. 172 Herrin sought authority to purchase the operating rights of vendor which had conducted no
operations for over a year. The transaction was intended to enable
Herrin to institute a single-line service; twenty shippers and consignees and three of Herrin's connecting carriers supported it.
Other shippers supported the protestants. Two successive Hearing
Examiners recommended denial because "to permit vendee to
institute the service authorized by vendor's certificate in this
highly competitive area [between New Orleans and Mobile] would
have the effect of imposing a penalty on intervenors ... at a time
when available traffic is diminishing." In addition, "the revenue
which the intervenors derive from handling interline shipments
is essential to their operations. The diversion of a substantial
amount of this traffic to vendee would no doubt impair their
ability to continue their present service. The evidence adduced

171 General Transportation Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 981,
affd. per curiam 329 U.S. 668 (1946) [approval of purchase of dormant rights sustained:
revocation can be effectuated only in accordance with the procedure set forth in §212(a),
49 U.S.C. (1952) §!ll2(a) of the act; plaintiff's argument that vendor had ceased to be a
common carrier since it no longer held itself out to the general public (49 U.S.C. (1952)
§303(a)(l4) rejected]. Accord: Quaker City Bus. Co.-Purchase-Blackhawk Line, 38 M.C.C.
603 at 606 (1942); Powell Bros. Truck Lines, Inc.-Purchase-John B. Bryan, 39 M.C.C.
11 at 17 (1943): "Regular-route common carriers •.• are not called upon to transport
traffic between each and every combination of points which they are authorized to serve,
and •to require a continuity of operation in this respect would destroy a carrier's flexibil•
ity of service contrary to the declaration of policy in the act. . . • The mere nonuser
by Bryan of his right to operate between St. Louis and Kansas City did not extinguish
his right to do so." Complaint dismissed in Byers Transport. Co. v. United States, r,N .D.
Mo. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 828.
172 (E.D. La. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 89, affd. per curiam 344 U.S. 925 (1953).
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by shippers
indicates a preference for the proposed through
service more than it shows a real need...." 173
Division 4 granted approval on the ground of need and lack
of a showing that existing carriers would be "materially" affected,
but the full Commission agreed with the examiners and reversed.174
The court refused to interfere, observing that there was a rational
basis for the denial and the weighing of conflicting evidence was
the job of the Commission.175 Again, the Commission had not
elaborated its reasons for resolving the conflict one way rather
than the other, although its reversal of the prior report on the
same record should have been explained by such elaboration.
Yet, the relatively large size of the vendee and the finding by the
examiners as to the disastrous effect of the proposal on competing
carriers rendering satisfactory service plausibly support this and
similar denials. 176 Hence, it would appear that acquisition of
dormant rights is governed by the same principles as acquisition
of active rights. However, other applications, including some by
small vendees, relating to dormant or little used rights have also
been denied on the ground that no need had been shown for what
would be, in effect, a new service in spite of the fact that in some
cases vendee had considerable shipper support. These reports do
not even refer to specific evidence as to the repercussions, if any,
such a purchase would have on competitors.177
173 108 F. Supp. at 92.
174 Herrin Transportation

Co.-Purchase-Mobile Express, 57 M.C.C. 523 at 532
(1951), revd. 58 M.C.C. 59 (1951).
175 108 F. Supp. at 94-95.
176 McLean Trucking Co.-Purchase-D. J. Black, 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf33,731 (1956);
Pacific Intermountain Express-Purchase-Browning Freight Lines, 58 M.C.C. 629 at
638 (1952); Shein's Express-Purchase (Portion)-Central Jersey Motor Lines, 59 M.C.C.
534 at 548-549 (1953) (vendor's operations not active or continuous, no record of interlining between parties, serious threat to existing carriers, no evidence of shipper support).
See also L. Nelson 8: Sons Transport. Co.-Purchase-White's Express 8: Transfer Co.,
59 M.C.C. 675 at 679 (1953); American Red Ball Transit Co.-Purchase-B 8: H Transfer
&: Storage Co., 9 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf32,408 (1952).
177 Interstate Motor Freight System-Purchase-Wesson Co., 55 M.C.C. 222 (1948);
A. A. O'Connor-Purchase--McCullough Trucking Co., 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf33,708
(1956) (Comr. Mitchell dissented on the ground that protestants had made no case against
this "sale of rights by a small business man"). Loo-Mac Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)Gordons Transports, 55 M.C.C. 196 at 201 (1948) (refers only -to "possible adverse effect"
of resumption of operations by new carrier on existing carriers); Kenosha Auto Transport
Corp.-Purchase-Frey and Witt, 55 M.C.C. 76 (1948) (vendor never conducted any business,
purchase of "bare" certificate disallowed); Transcon Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Anderson
Motor Service Co., 56 M.C.C. 521 at 534, 549, 555 (1950) (much shipper support, but
protestants are large and efficient operators, traffic in area is decreasing, new service not
justifiable). Accord: Liberty Motor Freight Lines-Purchase-Tumbleson, 59 M.C.C. 581
(1953); Groendyke Transport-Purchase-Foree Trans. Co., 10 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf32,841
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The total picture is~ thus, confused on several accounts: If
vendee is a small carrier, or if protestants are larger than the applicants, serious threats to the competitive survival of existing
carriers do not seem likely. Moreover, some reports imply that
serious consequences need not be shown, and that the applicants
have the burden of proof as to the public interest. Indeed, in Ratner-Control-Tompkins Motor Lines178 an individual who controlled three motor carriers sought to acquire control of a vendor
whose rights had not been exercised to any appreciable extent
with respect to certain specified commodities. In denying the ap•
plication, two members of Division 4 said:
"Most protestants have indicated the volume of their traffic in the considered territory, and although they have not detailed specifically the traffic which they believe would be lost
to such proposed operations, their evidence is sufficient to
show that they would be adversely affected thereby. The burden of showing that ·the proposed coordinated operations
would meet a public need and would be consistent with the
public interest is upon applicant. In the instant proceeding,
that showing has not been made."
A divided three-judge court affirmed, saying that "the use of these
words ... are unfortunate and do not correctly state the law," but
"a mere play of words" should not destroy the finding that the
proposed acquisition
" ... would create a new service in an area already adequately
served by motor carriers, and that such new service could
draw additional traffic only from existing carriers to the detriment of said existing carriers.... The term 'public interest'
as used in Section 5 clearly embraces the interest of competing carriers. Their interest and that of the general public is
the same in preventing uneconomic transportation. The entry
of plaintiff into the area would disrupt the competitive bal(1953). Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc.-Purchase-McMaster Bros. Transfer, Inc., 59 M.C.C.
609 at 614 (1953) (railroad opposition successful because of "complete absence of any
evidence showing a need for the reinstitution of service"); Willers, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Everson, 10 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff32,973 (1953) (burden of proof not met by
applicants); Atkinson & Sons-Purchase-Kellman, 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff33,705 (1956).
See also Von Der Ahe Van Lines-Purchase-Swornstedt Storage & Van Co., 60 M.C.C. 593
at 608, 610 (1954) (acquisition to enable vendee to add six new states to its radial rights
where its connecting carriers are too slow. All large Van Lines opposed; "possible adverse
effect" on them by this new service held to outweigh public benefits). See critical comment
in Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 374, 375. As to denials of applications for purchase
of dormant rights see Adams Report, pp. 281-286 (small carriers) and 300-303 (large
carriers).
178 70

M.C.C. 251, 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff33,799 (1956).
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ance with harmful effect on the competing earners without
compensatory benefits to the public...." 179
It would seem, then, that "the law" as distinguished from some
carelessly written reports requires a showing of inevitable damage
to opposing carriers.180 But, as noted above, many denials do not
elaborate how much of such damage, if any, must be shovm to
prevent approval of a purchase intended to revitalize dormant or
little used rights. On the other hand, in numerous other cases
approval was granted because the Commission concluded, sometimes on reconsideration, that there was a reasonable continuity
of service and competitors would be able to continue unimpaired
services even at the risk of some losses. 181 These decisions imply
that only pretty convincing evidence of oversupply of transporta119 Ratner v. United States, (S.D. Ill. 1957) 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[81,164, affd. per
curiam 356 U.S. 368 (1958).
180 Denver•Chicago Trucking Co. v. United States, (D.C. Colo. 1953) 9 CCH Fed. Car.
Cas. 1[80,846 (protestant's failure to appear at ·hearing deemed waiver of objection to
purchase application).
181 Shapiro-Purchase-Kasen, 56 M.C.C. 755 at 763 (1950) (small vendee wishing to
buy out a carrier which has not been an active competitor of protestants. "Some of the
truckload traffic which might be lost by them to vendees was available to them only
because of the inavailability of needed satisfactory less-than-truckload service"). Adlay
Express Co.-Purchase-Savage Truck Line, 65 M.C.C. 457 (1955) (acquisition by larger
carrier approved on condition that dormant parts of vendor's authority be cancelled;
expanding traffic in .territory thought to enable protestants to make adjustments). (Adams
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 296, 297); Holland Transportation Co.-Purchase-Th. Apicella,
56 M.C.C. 157 (1949) (vendor had leased its rights ·to lessee which became insolvent, receiver conducted no operations, no proof submitted by protestants that their functions
as common carriers would be impaired). Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)Carleton, 60 M.C.C. 415 (1954), denial affd. 65 M.C.C. 331 (1955), revd. 65 M.C.C. 781
(1956) (four dissents). See note 165 supra. Howard Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)McHugo Transfer Co., 60 .M.C.C. 57 (1954) (vendee, large household goods carrier in 29
states, wished to buy some operating rights of Washington carrier to avoid circuitous
transportation to Pacific Northwest. Eleven motor-carriers of household goods, including
the nation-wide systems, opposed, pleading that they would lose tonnage). See Adams
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 362-363. Shipper witnesses supported the application. Id.,
pp. 359-362. Division 4 denied approval because vendors, prior to agreement, had performed limited operations only, new service would be established and competitors are
entitled to protection. Reversed, 12 COH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,874 (1957) (vendors' operations
increased subsequent to purchase agreement). Watkins Motor Lines-Purchase-Peninsula
Corp., 10 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[32,980 (1953), reversing 58 M.C.C. 355 (1952) (operations by vendor had been limited prior to vendee's exercise of temporary authority,
and supporting shippers appeared at rehearing. Purchase of operating rights as to
canned goods approved in absence of showing of "serious" effect on competitors. Vendors
unused rights to transport numerous other commodities cancelled). For other cases of
approval conditioned on cancellation of a part of vendor's operating rights see Roy
Brothers Transport. Co.-Purchase-Maliar, 65 M.C.C. 339 (1955), and DeVenne-ControlAllman Transfer &: Moving Co., 65 M.C.C. 211 (1955), 65 M.C.C. 661 (1956). Adams
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 281, 299, 300. Mid-Continent Freight Lines-Purchase-Hanson
Motor Express, Inc., 65 ,M.C.C. 312 (1955), and Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 297-299
(cessation of operation for 11 months does not create dormancy, but rights not exercised
for several years shall be cancelled. Protestants must show "with some particularity"
that they cannot adjust to additional competition). Clifford Skipworth-Purchase-
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tion threatening maintenance of service and survival of competitors as a group should be recognized as justification for denial.
VI. HORIZONTAL MERGERS
The trucking mergers, consolidations, acquisitions of stock
or assets or purchases of operating rights discussed above involved
transactions between connecting carriers. "Horizontal" unifications of carriers operating in the same general territory182 seem to
be less frequent by comparison. They do not offer the advantages
of replacing interlining with single-line through service and complementing existing route patterns. Moreover, horizontal unifications would remove competition between vendor and vendee and
might thereby undermine the competitive strength of other carriers
serving the same area.
The Commission has shown awareness of these problems. For
instance, in 1946 it authorized Converse Trucking Service, a common carrier of heavy machinery in the Pacific Northwest, to lease
for five years the operating rights of Mitchell as to transportation
of general commodities. Mitchell had been running only one or
two vehicles a day between Portland and San Francisco, and
wished to confine his activities to intrastate operations in Oregon.
Converse believed that due to its greater resources it would conduct interstate operations over the same route more profitably
than Mitchell, particularly because the lease would enable Converse to transport a wider range of commodities. The Commission
approved, finding that lessee would provide a better service than
lessor and protesting competitors would not be seriously affected. 183
Prior to expiration of this lease, Converse and Mitchell filed
application under section 5 seeking approval for the purchase of
Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., 39 M.C.C. 741 (1944) (protestants' reference to discontinuance of vendor's operations and their ability to handle all available business
disregarded). Commissioner Miller dissented, citing Gregg Cartage &: Storage Co. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 74 at 83 (1942): " ..• any substantial interruption of one carrier's service
tends to result in expansion of other facilities to meet the continuing needs of shippers
and thus to cause overcrowding if the suspended service is resumed." In that case a
grandfather application was denied because applicant's services were interrupted during
the statutory period. Superior Trucking Co.-Purchase-Moore, 13 CCH Fed. Car. Cas.
1[34,284 (1958) (sporadic nature of vendor's operations, due to specialized nature of its authority, no bar to approval). Accord, Dennis Trucking Co.-Control-Johnson Tranfer,
13 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[34,295 (1958), modifying 70 M.C.C. 741 (no evidence offered by
protestants).
182 Definition by Dr. Adams, S. Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business
(Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 204 (1957). Dr. Adams
cited as an example an acquisition by a railroad-controlled truck line. See Adams Report,
note 58 supra, pp. 306-308 as to the special problems of such transactions.
183 Converse-Lease-Mitchell, 40 M.C.C. 452 (1946).
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the leased rights. At the same time, four interstate truckers
operating over the same routes sought to purchase the Mitchell
rights from Converse, together with the physical property of Converse used in the leased operations. Converse indicated that its
operations under the lease had been unprofitable and it needed
the proceeds from the proposed sale to the four truckers to pay
pressing obligations and secure working capital for its heavyhauling operations which it planned to retain. Although these
applications were supported by four shippers, the Commission,
nevertheless, denied, because the .case presented "the novel situation of four of the largest competing motor carriers operating
between Portland and San Francisco conceiving a plan, and joining together in its execution, for the elimination of the actual
competition which they have experienced in the past from service
rendered under Mitchell's operating rights; and, perhaps, of
greater importance from their standpoint, the potential competition which might be supplied in the future should the operating
rights come into the hands of a new and more aggressive operator.
. . . The plan is obviously one to restrain competition through conc;:erted action of the vendees as a group." 184
Subsequently, Converse improved operating results by closing
its rented terminal in Portland and by other economies. It then applied again for permission to buy the Mitchell rights, and, this
time, the four truckers who had participated in the previous proceeding as proposed buyers opposed the application. They conceded that Converse "has not been and is not now a serious competitive factor in the territory covered by the leased rights," but
voiced grave concern lest "vendee might sell the rights to a new and
more aggressive operator, in which event they would stand to lose
traffic and revenue which they cannot afford to do." The Commission, rejecting their protest, pointed out that if the new application
were to be denied, the leased rights would revert to Mitchell who
would offer the same competition to protestants. 185 An even
stronger reason, although not articulated in the report, was that
the protests against the purchase of the leased rights had no merit
because protestants' fears as to the future were mere speculation
and any future acquisition of the rights by some powerful new
buyer would anyway have to be approved by the Commission.
The denial of the first and approval of the second Converse pur184
185

Converse-Purchase-Mitchell, 56 M.C.C. 299 at 307-308 (1950).
Converse-Purchase-Mitchell, 57 M.C.C. 551 at 558-559 (1951).
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chase application would seem to imply that horizontal unification
proposals will be scrutinized as to their effect on competition. But
it is hard to generalize from the first Converse denial where disappearance of all competition was the aim of the parties. By contrast,
Dalby Motor Freight Lines, Inc. 186 involved a horizontal acquisition motivated by reasonable business purposes. Dalby wished
to acquire Webb's operating rights between Denver and Amarillo,
Texas, which duplicated Dalby's authorized operations except
that Dalby had no intrastate rights and no authority to serve certain off-route points named in Webb's certificate. Webb was on
the brink of receivership, and wished to retire from the business;
Dalby's operations over the considered route were also unprofitable. Approval would enable Dalby to offer a better balanced and
more complete service and bring about considerable economies
by eliminating duplication of expenses. In granting approval,
the Commission said:
"Applicant would be the only motor carrier of property operating over the entire route, but there are other such carriers
operating over segments of the same route, and a rail carrier
affords service to all principal points. The record does not
indicate that continuance of separate competitive operations
by applicant and vendor is warranted by the available traffic."181
This decision is in accord with the basic legislative intention
of preventing oversupply of transportation. Hence, under the
McLean Trucking Co. doctrine it correctly applies section 5 in
spite of the fact that competition between the parties was terminated. But even under section 7 of the Clayton Act this acquisition
may have been lawful if the Commission's above-quoted language
meant that Webb was in such straits as to preclude the probability
of his being able to continue in business.188 The transaction was
unopposed and there was no other buyer of Webb.
The problem of horizontal unifications has, apparently, most
frequently been raised in cases involving common control of
duplicate operations. Thus, in Florman-Control-Automobile
Convoy Co.189 the Commission denied an application for purchase of the stock of a carrier engaged in operations duplicating
186 Dalby Motor Freight Lines,
187 Id. at 622.
188 See Justice Stone's dissent in
(1980).

189 85

M.C.C. 521 (1940).

Inc.-Purchase-Webb, 85 M.C.C. 619 (1940).
International Shoe Co. v. ITC, 280 U.S. 291 at 806
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those of applicant over a considerable territory. Vendee's principal stockholder desired to sell to his brother a portion of vendor's
stock; hence, he intended to maintain the separate corporate
entities of vendee and vendor rather than effectuate a merger of
the two corporations~ Under common control they would "use
common terminals, repair, maintenance, ... accounting facilities,
and operating personnel, which would result in a material reduction in the operating expenses of each." Ignoring these advantages, the Commission held that creation of multiple corpora- ,
tions rendering similar or identical services was uneconomical
and incompatible with the policy of encouraging corporate simplification. Moreover,
"Common control of separate entities authorized to engage in
substantially duplicate operations affords opportunity for unfair competition and for unjust discriminations and preferences between shippers and consignees as to rates and practices .... Applicant contends that the application should be
approved unless we find that preferences or discriminations
will actually result. . . . Our consideration is not so limited
and necessarily includes weighing the possible effect of the
transaction upon the industry and the general public."190
This rule has been followed in other cases, sometimes accompanied
by the suggestion that the parties might consider merger.191 In
190 Id. at 524.
191 Franko-Control-White

Star Trucking Co., 36 M.C.C. 527 (1941) (no opposition,
but denied on the authority of Florman "without prejudice to the submission by the
parties of a revised plan under which the properties of Franko Brothers and White Star
would be unified through purchase, merger, or consolidation''); accord: Conklin Truck
Line, Inc.-Purchase-Bushroe, 37 M.C.C. 467 at 472 (1941) (argument that unification
not practical because of possible loss of intrastate certificates brushed aside); H & K
Motor Transportation, Inc.-Control-C. & L. E. Truck Co., 36 M.C.C. 23 at 28 (1940)
(denial and suggestion to merge); Textile Transportation, Inc.-Purchase-Textile Trans•
portation Corp., 38 M.C.C. 256 (1942) (extension of common control over operations
which would be competitive except for the fact of common control denied); Western
Motor Freight, Inc.-Purchase-Helphrey and Luft, 37 M.C.C. 692 (1941) (same); SuwakControl-Trolley Transfer Service, Inc., 39 M.C.C. 753 (1944) (same); Eick-Control-Alma
Lines, Inc., 38 M.C.C. 15 (1941) (same); Marion Trucking Co.-Investigation of ControlE. E. Mills Trucking Co., 59 M.C.C. 567 at 575 (1953) (same, order to terminate control
unla:wfully acquired and exercised); Associated Transport-Control and Consol.-Arrow
Carrier Corp., 36 M.C.C. 61 at 86-87 (1940) (large horizontal merger disapproved for fail.
ure to present satisfactory plan to accomplish "singleness of title''); Darling-ControlBrumm Transit, II CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,310 (1955); Chippewa Motor Freight-ControlMetza, 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,999 (1957). See also Great Lake and Texas Motor Transport-Lease-Crawford, 39 -M.C.C. 493 at 498 (1943), and Elliott Bros. Trucking Co. v.
United States, (D.C. Md. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 328 at 334. Compare Ballard & Skellet Van
Lines-Consol., 58 M.C.C. 539 at 551-552 (1952). Van Company was formed by Ballard
and Skellet companies whose rights were duplicating. All three would be managed
in a common interest: Van would take over interstate operations, buy the rights and
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some few instances the Commission insisted that a merger be accomplished concurrently with or in a short period after stock
acquisition. There was no evidence of adverse effects on competition in the territory. 192 When there is such evidence, the application will be denied on general grounds.1922
Significantly, the prohibition against common control of duplicating operations has not been applied when substantial differences in the nature of the operations of vendor and vendee compelled the conclusion that the parties were not competing with
each other.193 Approval was also granted where vendor's discontinuance was imminent due to distressed finances and illness and
old age of its officers,194 or when -it was feasible to eliminate partial duplications of the services involved. 195
properties of Ballard and Skellet and sell some of the latter to Watson. Van would
serve the same territory embraced in the rights of Skellet and Ballard and "permit
Watson to render a duplicate independent service in the same territory." Denied with
the suggestion that Ballard and Skellet "should be unified in a single operation, with
duplications eliminated, and without the creation of an additional competitive operation."
Although the report, regrettably, does not state that the additional competition would
threaten the protesting carriers, this may have been implied and would justify the
result. The principal .basis for the denial seems to have been the pyramiding of an
additional corporation upon the existing ones. The criticism of the decision in Adams'
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 366-371, overlooks that point.
192 Munroe and Arnold-Merritt Express, Inc.-Control-Beacon Fast Freight Co., 57
M.C.C. 539 at 547 (1951) (application for common control with promise that merger
would follow within 15 months denied, merger should be concurrent); Steffke Freight Co.Purchase-Albrent Freight and Storage Corp., 70 M.C.C. 321 (1957); Fitterling Transport
Co.-Control-Shippers Dispatch, 39 M.C.C. 595 at 600 (1944) (merger to take place
within 90 days after purchase of stock; twenty motor carriers were competing with applicants). Signal Harbor Service, Inc.-Purchase-Stordor .Express, 38 M.C.C. 247 at 248
(1942). Standard Freight Lines-Merger-Bates -Motor Transport, 40 M.C.C. 41 (1945),
approved a merger of two companies operating out of the same terminal with some
duplications in operating rights which would be eliminated.
192a Heavy Haulers, Inc.-Purchase (Portion) Billy Baker Co., 13 CCH Fed. Car Cas.
ff34,246 (1958), reversing 70 M.C.C. 365.
198 Hayes-Control-Terminal Transfer, CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff30,581 (1943) (vendee
in long-haul traffic, vendor in local cartage operations; general manager of vendor to be
given "added incentive" by participation in stock ownership; perhaps this was a "conglomerate" merger). See also Ryder System, Inc.-Control-Miller Motor Linc of N.C.,
12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff33,800 (1956) (acquisition and maintenance under common
control by Ryder of two trucking firms approved: intention of creating vast system
irrelevant for present case, operations of vendors different from those of prosperous and
growing protestant), petition for reconsideration pending. The expansion program of
the Ryder System is discussed in I.C.C. 71st ANN. REP. 55 (1957).
194 Ramos-Control-Overland Transfer Co., 35 M.C.C. 9 (1939). Dalby Motor Freight
Lines, notes 186-188 supra.
195 Standard Freight Lines, Inc.-Merger-Bates -Motor Transport, 40 M.C.C. 41
(1945); Lebovitz-Control-Connecticut -Motor Lines, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 104 at 108 (1953),
reversing 58 M.C.C. 487 (1952) (approved on condition that operating authority of vendee
be modified to preclude transportation of any ·traffic between Philadelphia and New
York, when such traffic originates at and is destined to those points); Davidson-Purchase-
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With respect to the related problem of interlocking individual
interests the Commission adopted similar policies. Noteworthy,
in this respect, is W. W. Brown-Purchase-W. W. Brown. 196
Brown and his four partners sought to buy the rights and property o~ Saginaw Transfer Co. of Saginaw, Michigan. The partnership was not a carrier, but each of the partners owned stock interests, some controlling ones, in other carriers. Brmvn himself
had purchased the Saginaw Transfer Co. which the partnership
wished to have transferred to it for operation by a corporation to
be organized. The routes of all the carriers involved coincided
at many points. Citing the Florman case, the Commission denied,
adding that " ... the practice of creating i:r;iterlocking interests in
various carriers . . . should be discouraged. Such practice is contrary to the Commission's policy of encouraging corporate simplification, creates conflicting interests and divided responsibility,
makes it difficult to ascertain where control actually lies in particular instances, and is not conducive to maintenance of healthy
competition between carriers and the rendition by them of efficient and adequate service to the public." 197
The decisions discussed above reflect the Commission's concern about the anti-competitive consequences of horizontal unifications. Indeed, it would seem that such concern is stronger than
with respect to end-to-end mergers. The potentiality of danger
to existing carriers rendering efficient service in the same territory as the proposed horizontal combination may be greater than
the peril of monopoly inherent in end-to-end mergers. On the
other hand, the smaller number of horizontal applications
may suggest that such transactions are less attractive to the industry. End-to-end and horizontal mergers may, of course, be
combined in one transaction, as in the McLean Trucking Co.
case, but this does not seem to be typical.
Campbell, 40 M.C.C. 333 (1945) (vendor would cancel operating rights between points
served by vendee). See also Baggett-Control-Walker Hauling Co., 65 M.C.C. 522 (1955);
Atlantic Freight Lines-Purchase-Shipley, 40 M.C.C. 183 (1945), and Lincoln Transport
Systems, Inc.-Control-Boss-Linco Lines, Inc. and Faxlines, 70 M.C.C. 205 (1956), for
unconditional approvals.
196 39
197 Id.

M.C.C. 373 (1943).
at 377. Cited and followed in Dobbs-Control-Van Hooser, 39 M.C.C. 647 at
654 (1944), modified 40 M.C.C. 804, and Peerless, Inc.-Control-Karst Freight Lines, 39
M.C.C. 683 at 696 (1944). See also Columbia Terminals Co.-Issuance of Notes, 40 M.C.C.
288 at 294 (1945) [§10 of Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. (1952) §20) applicable to issuance of
notes by corporation controlling three contract carriers and several lessors of equipment;
issuance authorized only after competitive bidding].
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CONCLUSION

The soundness of the considerations on which Federal Motor
Carrier Regulation rests has frequently been questioned. There
is much support for the proposition that motor carriers, unlike
railroads, are not natural monopolies because minimum and fixed
investments are relatively small and, therefore, economic regulation of an essentially competitive industry is unwarranted. 198 To
the adherents of this view "regulated competition is a misnomer"199 because "competition without freedom of entry is competition in an incubator."200
This controversy is outside the scope of the present discussion. Rather, the survey in the preceding pages attempted to
analyze and interpret the decisions on the basis of existing law
which reflects the assumption that a public utility-type regulation
is needed in order to prevent excessive competition. Charges
against the Commission of discrimination against small carriers201
and fostering a "dramatic increase" in trucking concentration202
overlook the fact that the Commission has no explicit or unquali10s Testimony of Paul Stevens, Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra, pp. 213-218,
and James C. Nelson, id. at 235, 236: "The so-called public utility industries generally
require a large minimum investment and much fixed investment, with the additional
result that economies of utilization •.. can be obtained by allowing additional business
to go to existing firms up to the point where least-cost utilization of a given plant is
achieved.••. Fixed investments and thus fixed costs are small because the truckers do
not have to provide their own rights-of-ways•... Moreover, their terminal investments
do not impose high fixed costs ... investment in equipment .•• is in relatively short-lived
and small-scale units ..• trucking, by its inherent nature is well organized as a highly
competitive rather than a monopolistic industry." See also Pegrum, "The Economic
Basis of Public Policy for Motor Transport," 28 LAND ECONOMICS 244 at 252-258 (1952).
S. Hearings Before Small Business Committee (Trucking Mergers and Concentration),
85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 54, 91, 125, 221 (1957).
199 Pegrum, "The Economic Basis of Public Policy for Motor Transport," 28 LAND
ECONOMICS 244 at 258 (1952).
200 Id. at 254.
201 See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 276-303, 333-350 (discussing condonation
of unlawful unified operations without prior Commission approval, acquisition of dormant
rights and mergers of carriers of household goods). Cf. North American Van Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Creston Transfer Co., 13 CCH Fed. Car. Cas.1f34,255 (1958) (right to trans.
port pianos, organs and organ benches excluded from approval of acquisition of authority
by North-American in order to protect small carrier of these goods operating seven
vehicles). Unifications involving an aggregate number of 20 or less vehicles are not subject
to section 5 [49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(10)), but to the Commission's rules on Transfer of Operating Rights, Title 49, Part 179, C.F.R. (1949, 1958 Supp.), issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
(1952) §312(b); authority sustained in United States v. Resler, 313 U.S. 57 (1941). In 1956
there were 994 such applications, of which 157 were denied for lack of fitness. All others
were granted. S. Hearings, note 198 supra, p. 112.
202 S. Hearings, note 198 supra, p. Ill: The Adams Report, note 58 supra, shows
that, in 1954, 4.7% of the carriers had 63% of the revenue. Chairman Clarke replied
that this was "infinitesimal,'' since the largest carrier had less than 2% of the business.
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fied mandate to prevent concentration. The real quarrel of the
critics, as Professor Jaffe suggested,203 is, therefore, with Congress
for failing to provide for such specific mandate, or with the Supreme Court for failing to resolve the conflict between section 7 of
the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act
along the lines suggested by the dissent in the McLean Trucking
Co. case. As noted in Part II above, the majority opinion in that
case directed the Commission merely to consider competition as an
important factor in each case, but to subordinate it to concentration if it finds the latter more conducive to insure efficient transportation. This makes the Commission's job much more difficult
than that of the antitrust enforcement agencies. The latter, in
the free segment of the economy, owe undivided allegiance to
only one sovereign: section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Our discussion of the cases demonstrates, I submit, that the
Commission has considered competition in each case.204 On the
whole, its performance of this task has been more convincing in
the trucking field than with regard to intercity buses. The Greyhound mergers examined in Part III show contradictions in treatment which, in some instances, emphasizes the perils of monopoly,
while praising the unmatched power of the system in others. In
the latter group of cases, "consideration" of competition sometimes
may have given way to disregard for competition. The trucking
cases, on the other hand, show a more consistent pattern. In the
first place, there is no single integrated and predominant giant
comparable to Greyhound; the structure of the trucking industry
with its many large carriers is thus much sounder. Secondly, we
observed that the majority of substantial unifications were of the
end-to-end or vertical type. They offer such obvious advantages
as substitution of through service for the hazards of interlining
that a prima facie case in their favor 205 often appears plausible. At
203 Jaffe,

"The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat," 65 YALE L. J. 1068 at 1072

(1956).
204 Statement of Commissioner Mitchell, S. Hearings, note 198 supra, p. 115. The
Senate Select Committee on Small Business admonished the Commission to do so, to keep
records of §5 cases, and to evaluate generally the level of concentration in the industry.
S. Rep. 1441, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1958).
205 The Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 309-315, 378-384, challenges the Commission's assumptions that increased size means greater efficiency. This criticism may
have general validity and deeper analysis of the problem by the Commission would,
certainly, be desirable. Yet Dr. Adams observes "-that high .tonmile costs seem related
to short hauls." Id. at 314. Is this not an implied admission of the case for end-to-end
mergers?
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least, those advantages appeared in many cases substantial enough
to warrant approval pursuant to the McLean Trucking Co. formula. No comparable case can be made for horizontal mergers, and
the Commission's attitude toward such transactions206 is helpful for
the preservation of competition.
Consideration of com petition in trucking merger cases has
proceeded on the theory that unifications should be prevented
only when they would impair the ability of competitors to continue as common carriers. This is consistent with the idea of "regulated" or "controlled" competition. It is assumed that competition is a desirable stimulant, but only up to a peril point beyond
which it begins to destroy itself. That approach may, after all,
not differ very radically from the notion that some mergers would
lessen or destroy competition while others would not. Hence, the
concept of "regulated" competition may, at least with respect to
mergers, be less outlandish than its opponents believe. In any
event, the Commission's theory demonstrates its concern for
competition.
Obviously, theories must stand the test of practical application.
As pointed out in Part IV above, the Commission has been criticized for its failure to spell out general standards or criteria for
determination of the crucial question whether ability of competitors to continue as common carriers will be impaired or
whether they could stand adjustments to stiffer competition.207
This criticism seems justified: insufficient elaboration of the basis
for the conclusions reached and vacillation shown by reversals of
prior opinions indicate that in a not insignificant number of
reports the point may have been decided merely by intuitive ad
hoc judgment. Surely, the Commission could do better than that.
Apparently, the Commission is not unaware of this deficiency.
Indeed, in Pacific lntermountain Express-Control and MergerUnion Transfer Co., decided on February 26, 1958,208 Division 4
reopened proceedings on a merger application on the ground
that applicants had "offered no evidence showing the possible
effect which ... [the merger] will have on the present traffic pat- ·
tern of ... [competing] carriers." Particularly, P.I.E. had not dis206 Although -McLean Trucking involved both vertical and horizontal mergers, it
is doubtful whether approval would have been granted without the vertical nature of
the transaction. The Supreme Court emphasized the end-to-end feature.
207 See note 162 supra, and text thereto.
208 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1J34,243 (1958).
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closed what volume, if any, it had interlined with carriers other
than vendor moving to and from points served by vendor. The volume interlined between the applicants had been insignificant. Referring to section 7 of the Clayton Act and quoting that part of the
McLean Trucking Co. opinion which admonished the Commission
"to consider the effect of the merger on competitors and on the
general competitive situation," the division said:
"The serious responsibility which the Congress has imposed
upon us in these proceedings cannot be properly discharged
upon records such as this .... Nor are we relieved of this responsibility by the fact that many of the competing carriers
refrained from intervening and introducing evidence. If
that were true, monopolies could develop merely from inaction by competing carriers, and applications would be
granted by default. The burden is upon applicants to submit
the necessary evidence, ... particularly in respect of the possible effect upon competing carriers. For example, the record
is devoid of evidence showing the extent to which the additional long-haul through service from Chicago, Minneapolis
and St. Paul to the West Coast by Pacific Intermountain
might reduce the opportunities for balance between shorthaul and long-haul traffic of the numerous carriers serving
the same territory, thereby substantially lessening their opportunity to maintain presently satisfactory service to the
public.
"The time has come when the carriers and the public
should be put on notice that this Commission expects applicants in Section 5 proceedings to support their proposals in
keeping with the legislative standards as interpreted by the
Supreme Court...."
The effect of this opinion on the future cannot be predicted.
Yet, its holding that the absence of protest by competitors will
henceforth not be considered as favorable to proposed acquisitions
by large carriers like P .I.E. is novel, and the general tone of the
report may herald a change of climate adverse to mergers. The
pending "unusually large" unification applications of Consolidated
Freightways and others209 afford ample opportunity to the Commission to reveal its thinking. It is to be hoped that this will lead
to the much needed careful analysis as to where and how the elusive
line is to be drawn between "constructive" and "destructive"
competition.
209

I.C.C. 71ST ANN. REP. 55 (1957).

